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Abstract
How does communication among voters affect turnout? And who benefits from it? In a lab-
oratory experiment in which subjects, divided into two competing parties, choose between
costly voting and abstaining, we study three pre-play communication treatments: No Com-
munication, a control; Public Communication, where all voters exchange public messages
through computer chat; and Party Communication, where messages are also exchanged but
only within one’s own party. Our main finding is that communication always benefits the
majority party by increasing its expected turnout margin and, hence, its expected margin
of victory and probability of winning the election. Party communication increases overall
turnout, while public communication increases turnout with a high voting cost but decreases
it with a low voting cost. With communication, we find essentially no support for the stan-
dard Nash equilibrium predictions and limited consistency with correlated equilibrium.
JEL codes: C72, C92, D72
Keywords: voter turnout, pre-play communication, lab experiment, correlated
equilibrium
1 Introduction
How does pre-play communication among economic agents affect collective decisions? Promi-
nent game-theoretic models for situations such as voting, contributing to a public good,
multi-lateral bargaining, auctions, and entry games, to name a few, typically discard the
availability of pre-play communication among the players. They do so, in part, because
of an increased complexity of the equilibrium analysis under communication, and, in part,
because original equilibria are maintained due to the non-binding nature of pre-play commu-
nication. Many experimental studies show, however, that pre-play communication can have
significant effects on outcomes in many different settings.1
In this paper, we attempt to explore the general principles behind pre-play communication
in a laboratory experiment on voter turnout, an application that combines features of free-
riding and team competition. The game is very simple: two groups of voters of commonly
known different sizes (think political parties) compete against each other in a winner-take-
all election under plurality rule. Voters simultaneously decide on a binary decision: vote or
abstain. Voting is costly, with a commonly known cost of voting that is the same for all
voters.
In the turnout game without communication, each player decides whether or not to vote
independently of others. The game-theoretic analysis of this case (Palfrey and Rosenthal,
1983) shows that, generally, there will be either one or two quasi-symmetric Nash equilibria,
in which all members of the same party mix with the same probability of voting. There are
also asymmetric equilibria, which we do not consider here, as they are logically implausible
without a device to break symmetries.2
With communication, the formal structure of the turnout game changes dramatically, as
individual turnout decisions can now be correlated. Allowing for correlation greatly expands
the set of equilibria. In fact, the game with unrestricted communication admits an infinite
number of equilibria, with expected total turnout ranging between nearly zero and twice the
size of the minority party for all positive voting costs, such that abstention is not a dominant
strategy (Pogorelskiy, 2014).
We study the effects of unmediated pre-play communication on turnout. Before making their
decisions, subjects engage in free-form communication by broadcasting computer chat mes-
sages to subsets of players. We consider two cases: public communication, where players can
1See, e.g., Cooper et al. (1992), Agranov and Tergiman (2014), Agranov and Yariv (2015), Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1991), and Palfrey, Rosenthal, and Roy (2015).
2See Alos-Ferrer and Kuzmics (2013) and Kuzmics and Rogers (2010).
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exchange public messages visible to all participants; and party communication, where players
can exchange messages that are public only within their own party (majority or minority).
These communication protocols have broad analogs to communication that occurs in real
elections. For example, car bumper stickers can be interpreted as public messages, while
Facebook status updates, visible only to one’s own group of friends or social connections,
are examples of group-based public messages.3
A generalization of correlated equilibrium, subcorrelated equilibrium is used to characterize
the equilibria with party communication (Pogorelskiy, 2015). While our experiment (and
the model) does not have any explicit centralized mobilization efforts per se, one can view
the kind of decentralized communication studied here as corresponding to neighborhood in-
formation exchanges (Grosser and Schram, 2006), conversations and interactions with family
and friends, or communication via social media.4
In addition to the communication treatment, the experiment varies two other crucial pa-
rameters of the model: the voting cost (“low” cost vs. “high” cost) and the relative party
sizes (large vs. small minority). This leads to a 3× 2× 2 design with a total of 12 different
treatments. A novel feature of this study is the sensitivity of turnout to changes in these
parameters under our restrictions on communication, which allows us to identify interaction
effects between communication mode and key parameters of the theoretical model.
The main finding of the experiment is that communication affects turnout for the majority
and minority parties in much different ways. Specifically, communication benefits the ma-
jority party, as it increases the expected turnout margin relative to no communication, and,
hence, increases the expected margin of victory for the majority and the probability of the
majority winning. The finding is unambiguous, robust, and quite strong. We observe it
in all treatments, for both communication protocols, both low and high voting costs, and
both large and small majorities. Furthermore, in almost all cases, the effects are statistically
significant and large in magnitude. This result is not only strong, but also surprising (at
least to us), in the sense that it is not predicted by any theoretical model of which we are
aware, including our correlated and subcorrelated equilibrium models.5
3Bond et al. (2012) studied effects of a very influential group-based message in a turnout setting featuring
the “I Voted” button on top of Facebook users’ newsfeed.
4Field experimental studies, which usually isolate a particular communication mechanism, have shown
significant but mixed evidence (Gerber and Green, 2000; Gerber et al., 2011), which is perhaps not surprising,
given the variety of different ways in which people communicate. Effectiveness of political communication
depends on complex interactions of different communication mechanisms, political actors, and institutional
structures (Druckman, 2014).
5The theoretical model of Denter and Sisak (2015) shows that, under certain conditions, perfect polls
(a restricted form of communication) can create momentum in favor of the front-running candidate. The
underlying mechanism, however, is totally different, as in their model, two candidates strategically choose
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The experiment also generates three other findings that complement this main finding.
First, the communication design of the experiment allows us to test the consistency of ex-
perimental data under communication with correlated equilibrium. Although correlated equi-
libria have been largely ignored in the experimental study of pre-play communication, they
are particularly well-suited for the analysis of such games.6 This is especially the case with
our design, as it includes both public and party communication mechanisms, which require
somewhat different variations on the correlated equilibrium concept. We design several new
tests to check for the consistency with correlated equilibrium and find that voting cost plays
an important role here: with low cost and group communication, we cannot reject the hy-
pothesis that the data are generated by a correlated equilibrium, while with high cost, this
is no longer the case for either communication treatment. On the other hand, in almost
all communication treatments, we reject the hypothesis that voters’ individual decisions are
independent, implying no support for Nash equilibrium under communication.
Second, we identify an interaction effect between the structure of communication and the
cost of voting. Party communication increases total turnout. With a low voting cost, pub-
lic communication decreases total turnout. With a high voting cost, public communication
increases total turnout (except the small minority case in which the effect is positive but
not significant). Thus, we identify a cost/communication interaction effect, whereby cost
considerations appear to be an important factor in participation decisions under commu-
nication, which ties in with some existing empirical results (Brady and McNulty, 2011;
Hodler, Luechinger, and Stutzer, 2015). Surprisingly, public communication, at an election
stage where voters’ preferences have already been formed, can be detrimental to getting out
the vote.
Third, we find that turnout rates are affected by the the voting cost and election competitive-
ness. Theoretically, turnout in each party is higher when costs are lower. We observe this
cost effect in all treatments, except with public communication. We also observe positive
effects of ex ante election competitiveness on turnout (as measured by the relative party
sizes), holding the other treatment dimensions constant.7
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.1, we provide a brief
literature review. In Section 2, we describe the details of our experimental design. Section 3
presents our findings at the electorate level and party level. Section 4 concludes. Additional
investments in their political campaigns, trying to influence the decisive voter’s probabilistic choice.
6A notable exception is Moreno and Wooders (1998). See also Cason and Sharma (2007), and Duffy and
Feltovich (2010) for studies of abstract games with recommended play.
7The cost and competition effects have support from other experiments (Levine and Palfrey, 2007; Herrera,
Morelli, and Palfrey, 2014; Kartal, 2015).
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estimation details are in Appendix A. Experimental instructions are in Appendix B.
1.1 Related Literature
Several studies have investigated the effects of restrictive communication mechanisms – such
as neighborhood information exchange and polls – on voter turnout. Grosser and Schram
(2006) consider the effects of communication in the form of neighborhood information ex-
change. In their model, every two voters form a neighborhood, with one being an early voter
(sender) and one a late voter (receiver). They find that information exchange increases
turnout, although these results seem to be sensitive to the analyzed sender-receiver protocol.
Grosser and Schram (2010), and Agranov et al. (2013) study the effects of polls on turnout
and welfare in the lab.8 In particular, Agranov et al. (2013) show that polls do not have
negative welfare effects. More relevant to the current paper, the authors also find evidence
for voting with the winner, where a voter is more likely to turn out if she thinks that her
preferred candidate is more likely to win. This result ties in nicely with our main finding
that communication benefits the majority party by increasing its expected margin of victory.
Our experiment differs from Agranov et al.’s, in that it studies communication by means
of free-form computerized chat with public messages (either public within a party or public
within the whole electorate), and in our environment, there is no uncertainty about party
sizes.
In theory, such pre-play communication can replicate the effects of both polls and neigh-
borhood information exchanges. Schram and Sonnemans (1996a) study Schram and van
Winden’s (1991) social pressure turnout model in the lab and find that communication in-
creases turnout. There are two groups, each with opinion leaders who produce social pressure
on others to turn out. One of the basic predictions of that model is that communication in-
creases turnout. In their experiment, for five minutes, there was oral communication among
the members of the same group, after which five more rounds of the game without further
communication were played. This is different from having pre-play communication in each
round, as in our paper.
Another related paper is Kittel, Luhan, and Morton (2014). They study three-party elections
with costly voting, varying voter preference types (swing voters, who have strict rankings
over three parties, vs. partisans, who strictly prefer one party but are indifferent between
8Morton et al. (2015), in a natural experiment, estimate that exit polls decrease turnout and increase
bandwagon voting. Theoretic models of polls include McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985) and Denter and Sisak
(2015).
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the two less preferred ones); party labels; and pre-play communication protocol (public
across groups vs. public within groups, as in our experiment). Kittel et al. find that
communication increases both turnout and the amount of strategic voting. The effects of
the communication protocol on turnout depend on voter preferences and are nuanced. In
particular, swing voters and partisans show different turnout rates: swing voters assigned to
their second choice are more likely to turn out in the “all-chat” than in the “party-chat,”
while swings assigned to their first choice, as well as partisans, show no difference. While we
use similar communication treatments, our results are not directly comparable since three-
party elections introduce a completely different motive for voting, and introduce additional
strategic considerations.
Several strands of the literature are less related to our paper. One studies the effects of
deliberation on jury voting, where abstention is not allowed (Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and
Palfrey, 2000; Goeree and Yariv, 2011).9 Another studies the performance of the rational
turnout models in the lab but without communication among voters (Schram and Sonne-
mans, 1996b; Levine and Palfrey, 2007; Duffy and Tavits, 2008; Herrera, Morelli, and Palfrey,
2014; Kartal, 2015). There are also studies of communication within and between teams in
team contests in which members choose individual effort levels that determine the joint team
output. See, in particular, Sutter and Strassmair (2009), who find that within-team com-
munication increases average effort levels. Balliet (2010) surveys studies of communication
in social dilemmas with a focus on the prisoner’s dilemma.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 Environment
In this section, we provide some theoretical background for the pivotal-voter model of Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1983) on which our experiment builds. There are n voters divided into two
parties, A and B, with a number of supporters nA > nB = n−nA > 0. Voters in each party
decide between voting for their respective party (action 1) or abstaining (action 0). The
election is decided by a simple plurality rule, with ties broken randomly. Voting is costly,
with c ∈ (0, 1/2) being the common voting cost. The utility of voting net of voting cost is
normalized to 1 if the voter’s preferred party wins, 1/2 if there is a tie, and 0 otherwise.
9Goeree and Yariv (2011) use a free-form chat communication protocol and find that communication
significantly improves information aggregation and efficiency. They allow subjects to send messages to any
subset of other subjects and observe that almost 100% of messages are public.
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The game has complete information, and the only uncertainty from a player’s point of view
comes from not knowing what, exactly, everybody else is going to choose. Each voter would
ideally prefer her party to win the election without her actually voting, so the game combines
a free-rider problem with a collective action problem in each party.
Rational voters trade off the expected benefits from voting against the cost, so the probability
of their vote changing the election outcome is the key factor. In equilibrium, this so-called
pivot probability is determined endogenously. The other important variables are probabilities
of a tie and near tie (i.e., a tie ± one vote), which provide a measure of the expected closeness
of the election, as well as the probability of the minority party winning (the upset rate), which
affects a measure of social welfare. The equilibrium logic leads from the primitives of the
model (party sizes and voting cost) to predictions about these probabilities and about the
turnout rates in each party and in the whole electorate.
In the experiment, we vary the sizes of the parties, nA and nB, the common voting cost c, and
the communication protocol. The last factor is especially important, because communication
allows voters’ actions to be correlated, which can, in theory, lead to higher turnout than
predicted by the standard Nash equilibria. The main difference between Nash (NE) and
correlated equilibria (CE), developed in Aumann (1974, 1987) and formally defined below,
is that in the latter, players’ strategies can be correlated, while in a Nash equilibrium, all
players decide whether to vote or abstain independently. Thus, a Nash equilibrium is also a
correlated equilibrium, but (in a formal sense) almost all correlated equilibria are not Nash
equilibria.
Pogorelskiy (2014), in an analysis of correlated equilibria in turnout games, characterizes the
bounds of the set of CE in these games. In particular, CE can have total expected turnout
of up to twice the size of the minority party when the minority is large (i.e., the minority’s
size is at least 50% that of the majority), and up to the majority size in the remaining, small
minority, case. These equilibria presume unrestricted communication among all players.
Subcorrelated equilibrium (SCE), proposed in Pogorelskiy (2015), is a correlated equilibrium
with additional restrictions on the structure of admissible correlations: in the turnout game,
SCE allows players’ choices to be correlated within their party, but requires independence
of players’ choices across parties. It turns out that in the large minority case, one can limit
communication in this way (i.e., to remain unrestricted only within each party) and still get
twice the size of the minority as the theoretical upper bound on the expected total turnout.
However, this restriction to within-party communication is binding in the small minority
case and implies a lower upper bound.
6
The above considerations led us to implement the following 2× 2× 3 design: large minority
(nA = 6, nB = 4) vs. small minority (nA = 7, nB = 3); high cost (c = 0.3) vs. low cost
(c = 0.1); and three communication treatments. With respect to communication, the three
treatments were: No Communication (NC); Public Communication (PC), where players
communicate prior to playing the turnout game by exchanging public messages visible to all
participants; and Group-restricted public communication (GC), where players can exchange
messages that are visible only to other members of their own group/party. The total group
size of ten is, arguably, small, so one might wonder how relevant our results could be for large
electorates. It is important to point out here that the group size is not chosen in isolation,
but in combination with the unmediated public chat treatments. Cognitive limitations may
preclude efficient unmediated communication in larger groups. Furthermore, a very large
electorate can be modeled as a sparse network of small, “family-size” clusters, implicit or
explicit. For example, the Facebook news-generating algorithm necessarily limits the amount
of information and the number of updates a user can see, thus avoiding cognitive overload.
Therefore, the effects of communication in small groups may well propagate to the larger
aggregate levels.
Table 1 summarizes equilibria with maximal expected turnout. The table shows the max-
imum expected turnout rates for Nash,10 correlated and subcorrelated equilibria, for the
four treatments in the party-size/voting-cost domain, as well as relevant related equilibrium
probabilities. We denote by TA (TB) the expected equilibrium turnout rate in party A (B);
T is the total expected turnout rate; Tie is the probability of a tie, Pivot is probability of a
pivotal event (defined as tie± one vote); Upset is the probability of the minority party win-
ning (upset rate); and Margin is the expected margin of victory for party A. The expected
margin of victory is defined as
Margin =
nATA − nBTB
nATA + nBTB
. (1)
Table 1 shows several patterns of the theoretical equilibrium properties across treatments.
We emphasize those regarding the total turnout in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In equilibria that maximize expected turnout under our parameters, the to-
tal turnout rate is 1) weakly increasing with correlation in voters’ actions (from a Nash to
a Subcorrelated to a Correlated equilibrium); 2) increasing in ex ante election competitive-
10Given the anonymous random matching and the symmetric structure of the game for each party, we
limit attention to Nash equilibria in which all members of the party mix with the same probability. This is
standard in the analysis of data from turnout experiments: e.g., Schram and Sonnemans (1996b); Agranov et
al. (2013). Other kinds of highly asymmetric Nash equilibria are discussed in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983).
7
Table 1: Theoretical values for equilibria with maximal total expected turnout
Nash Quasi-Symmetric
nA nB c TA TB T Tie Pivot Upset Margin
6 4 .1 .625 .375 .525 .089 .298 .083 .428
– – .3 .161 .253 .198 .322 .781 .518 −.023
7 3 .1 .521 .479 .508 .098 .319 .009 .435
– – .3 .147 .380 .217 .310 .773 .545 −.052
Subcorrelated Equilibria
nA nB c TA TB T Tie Pivot Upset Margin
6 4 .1 .667 1.000 .800 .200 .636 .365 .000
– – .3 .667 1.000 .800 .600 .790 .421 .000
7 3 .1 .725 .482 .652 .096 .278 .048 .556
– – .3 .544 .799 .620 .479 .691 .240 .227
Correlated Equilibria
nA nB c TA TB T Tie Pivot Upset Margin
6 4 .1 .667 1.000 .800 .200 .636 .365 .000
– – .3 .667 1.000 .800 .600 .790 .421 .000
7 3 .1 .831 .296 .670 .059 .335 .030 .735
– – .3 .591 .716 .628 .429 .764 .215 .317
Notes: There are other correlated equilibria with smaller total
turnout, and a low-turnout quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium
that is not listed here.
ness, except under high voting cost in the quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium; and 3) weakly
decreasing in the voting cost.
2.2 Procedures
We ran a total of ten sessions with a high common cost (c = 0.3) and another ten sessions
with a low common cost (c = 0.1), with the main focus on the effects of communication.
For each cost, there were two sessions of no communication (NC) and four sessions each of
the two communication treatments: group communication (GC), and public communication
(PC). We used a within-subjects design for the relative size treatment in each session, and
we recruited 20 subjects per session to mitigate the effects of shared histories in the presence
of communication. The same communication mode (NC, GC, or PC) was used throughout
the entire session. No subject participated in more than one session. For communication
treatments, we limited the duration of chat to 110 seconds.11
Each session consisted of 20 matches. In each match of the game, players in the majority
and the minority group were asked to decide whether to abstain or to vote, knowing the
11When analyzing chat logs, it was clear that this amount of time was more than enough for meaningful
communication.
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common voting cost. To induce as neutral an environment as possible, no voting context
was mentioned, as in Levine and Palfrey (2007). Majority and minority parties were called
“type A” and “type B,” respectively. Subjects chose between two abstract options, X and Y ,
which corresponded to voting and abstention, respectively. The voting cost was implemented
as an opportunity cost (i.e., choosing option Y would result in a bonus payoff equal to c).
An example of the user interface is shown in Figure 2 in Appendix A.
Subjects were randomly assigned to parties and electorates according to the following algo-
rithm. First, all subjects were randomly split into majority and minority pools. For example,
for size (6, 4) and 20 subjects in a session, the majority pool had 12 people, and the minority
pool had 8. Next, for each of the two ten-subject electorates, two subgroups were formed
by randomly picking the corresponding number of subjects from each pool. This step was
repeated for ten matches (part 1). Thus, for ten matches, the assignment of subjects to
parties remained unchanged, but the actual membership of the parties in each electorate
changed in each match. For the next ten matches (part 2), new majority and minority pools
were created as follows. All subjects from the former minority pool were assigned to the new
majority party pool, with the remaining members of the new majority party pool assigned
randomly from the previous majority pool. We chose this scheme to mitigate the inherent
inequality of payoffs across subjects since, in either size treatment, the majority was more
likely to win.12 Subjects’ IDs within their party were randomly re-assigned every round. In
communication treatments, each message contained information about the sender’s ID and
party, so public messages from different subjects could be clearly distinguished.
We did not inform subjects about the number of matches in each part. Instructions for part
2 were delivered after part 1 concluded. Two rounds from each part were randomly selected
and the subjects paid, so the payoff of each subject was the sum of payoffs in four rounds
plus the show-up fee of $7. Overall, the 20-session, 2 × 2 × 3 design used 400 subjects,
which generated a dataset with a total of 800 elections. The average payoff per subject was
$28.99. Sessions with communication lasted approximately 1.5 hours, and sessions without
communication took a bit less than one hour.13 Sample instructions are in Appendix B.
Table 2 summarizes our design and experimental parameters.
12We encountered a minor software issue once when switching to part 2 in two sessions ((7,3)(6,4), high
cost, and either PC or GC). The resulting session protocol violation was that not all of the minority voters
in part 1 might have been switched to the majority in part 2. There were no other violations, and we do not
view this as an issue for the analysis.
13All sessions were conducted at the UC-Irvine Experimental Social Science Laboratory (ESSL). The com-
puter software was developed using the Multistage framework (http://multistage.ssel.caltech.edu).
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Table 2: Session Summary
Communication Session Cost c = 0.1 Session Cost c = 0.3
First 10 rounds Last 10 rounds First 10 rounds Last 10 rounds
Group Chat 1 (6,4) (7,3) 2 (6,4) (7,3)
3 (7,3) (6,4) 4 (7,3) (6,4)
5 (6,4) (7,3) 6 (6,4) (7,3)
7 (7,3) (6,4) 8 (7,3) (6,4)
Public Chat 9 (6,4) (7,3) 10 (6,4) (7,3)
11 (7,3) (6,4) 12 (7,3) (6,4)
13 (6,4) (7,3) 14 (6,4) (7,3)
15 (7,3) (6,4) 16 (7,3) (6,4)
No Chat 17 (6,4) (7,3) 18 (6,4) (7,3)
19 (7,3) (6,4) 20 (7,3) (6,4)
Notes: Each row represents two sessions. Table cells contain the sizes of (Majority, Minority) for
each treatment. For each communication regime and voting cost, each session combined two size
treatments and had 20 rounds total, with two independent electorates in each round.
3 Results
For each treatment, Figure 1 presents the averages of turnout rates in each party and the total
turnout rate.14 The corresponding numerical values are reported in Table 14 in Appendix A.
With our 2× 2× 3 design and 20 sessions, the total number of elections was 40 in each NC
treatment and 80 in each GC and PC treatment. To account for possible correlation across
rounds and across ten-person groups (as group composition changed after every round),
we treated each group over ten rounds as a panel, and computed panel-corrected standard
errors with a correction for first-order autocorrelation within each panel.15 Figure 1 shows
a number of differences across treatments, which we discuss and test below.
A quick comparison with the theoretic predictions for max-turnout equilibria in Table 1 shows
that Nash equilibrium is not very consistent with the behavior observed in our experiment:
average total turnouts rates in the data are much higher (with one exception) than in the
maximal turnout Nash equilibria predictions of Table 1, already in the NC treatment, and
even more so in the GC treatment.
14To save space and for expositional clarity, for many of our results, we report additional supporting figures
and estimation details (e.g., standard errors and p-values) in Appendix A. In addition to the turnout-related
results reported in this section, we also look at the effects on welfare, which, in this model, highlights the
tradeoff between the probability the majority group wins, the voting cost, and the expected total turnout.
Reducing the voting cost or the relative minority size increases total welfare in all treatments. Communication
increases welfare under low voting cost, but decreases it under high voting cost, for partition (7,3). Detailed
results are available from the authors upon request.
15We also ran the standard two-sample t-test for mean comparisons across treatments, which assumes
independent observations in each sample, and found very similar results. Clustering by subject also produced
similar outcomes. The findings we report in Figure 1 and Table 14 are more conservative.
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Figure 1: Average turnout rates.
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Similar to the stylized facts from real-world elections and many past experimental findings,
voters in the lab tend to over-vote compared to the Nash equilibrium. In contrast, a casual
inspection of the turnout rates suggests that the data might be consistent with correlated and
subcorrelated equilibrium predictions, although to establish this more rigorously requires a
deeper analysis, which we present below in Section 3.4.
Total turnout rates in Figure 1 are somewhat lower than the max-turnout correlated and
subcorrelated equilibrium predictions in Table 1, but they seem to satisfy the constraint of the
turnout upper bound. Thus, it might be possible to associate correlated and subcorrelated
equilibria with expected turnout that would match the data. In order to check this, we
develop and apply a formal direct test for consistency with correlated and subcorrelated
equilibria in Section 3.4.2.
Figures 3 – 4 in Appendix A provide a more-detailed presentation of voting patterns in the
majority and minority parties. There, we also estimate individual voting probabilities for
each subject (see Figure 5 in Appendix A).
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. In Sections 3.1-3.3, we statistically test
the treatment effects of changes in communication protocol, voting cost, and relative party
sizes. These behavioral effects are tested for using group-level decisions and do not rely on
specific assumptions about equilibrium behavior. In Section 3.4, we look at voting profile
frequencies and check whether these patterns are consistent with equilibrium behavior. In
Section 3.5, we focus on communication treatments and report the analysis of the chat logs.
3.1 Effects of communication on turnout
We start our analysis by looking at the main effect of interest: how communication affects
turnout.
Result 1. (Total Turnout) Group communication increases total turnout. Public com-
munication increases turnout under high cost (except one case), but decreases turnout under
low cost.
Support. To test for the effect of communication on total (and party) turnout, we compared
the average turnout rates under two different communication modes, while keeping party
sizes and voting cost fixed.16
From Table 3, we see that, for each treatment, GC increases total turnout, compared to NC.
By contrast, the effect of PC is quite mixed. With high cost, PC increases total turnout,
16We report two-sided p-values in Table 16 in Appendix A.
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Table 3: Effects of Communication on Turnout and Victory Margin
Group Communication minus No Communication
nA nB c ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ ∆TˆA −∆TˆB ∆Margin
6 4 0.1 0.274∗∗∗ −0.214∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗
– – 0.3 0.244∗∗∗ 0.018 0.154∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗
7 3 0.1 0.208∗∗∗ 0.060 0.160∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.118
– – 0.3 0.150∗∗∗ −0.094 0.076∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗
Public Communication minus No Communication
nA nB c ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ ∆TˆA −∆TˆB ∆Margin
6 4 0.1 −0.108∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ 0.121∗ 0.124∗
– – 0.3 0.203∗∗∗ 0.089∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
7 3 0.1 −0.034 −0.196∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.143
– – 0.3 0.066∗ −0.091 0.018 0.153∗∗ 0.257∗∗
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1
although this increase is significant only in the large minority treatment. On the other hand,
PC decreases turnout significantly with low cost for both size treatments. 
Result 2. (Party Turnout) Communication affects party turnout differently for the ma-
jority and minority parties: in all cases, communication increases (decreases) turnout more
(less) for the majority party than for the minority party. Thus, communication always in-
creases the expected margin of victory for the majority party. With group communication, it
uniformly increases majority turnout and has either no effect or a negative effect on minority
turnout. With public communication, it usually affects turnout by the two parties in the same
direction, but with systematically different magnitudes: with low cost, it decreases turnout by
both parties; with high cost, it increases turnout by both parties or has no significant effect.
Support. Looking at the party turnout rates in Table 3, we see that GC increases majority
turnout for each treatment, compared with NC. PC increases majority party turnout for each
majority size and high cost, but decreases majority turnout under low cost (the decrease is
not significant for the large minority treatment).
The effect of communication on minority turnout is less pronounced. GC decreases minority
turnout, compared to NC for the large minority and low cost. PC decreases minority turnout,
compared to NC for each size treatment and the low cost; it marginally increases under
high cost and large minority and shows an insignificant decrease under high cost and small
minority.
The next-to-last column of Table 3 shows the difference between the marginal effect of
communication on majority turnout compared to its effect on minority turnout. In all
cases, ∆TˆA − ∆TˆB is positive and statistically significant. Because nA > nB, this implies
immediately that communication increases the expected margin of victory for the majority
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party.17 The increase is significant in all treatments except for the low cost, small minority.
See the last column of Table 3. 
Next, we look at the effects of communication on several electoral characteristics: probability
of ties, pivotal events, and upsets.
Result 3. (Pivotal Events and Upsets) Communication nearly uniformly decreases
probabilities of ties and pivotal events, and significantly so for pivotal events under group
communication (all except for low cost and small minority), as well as one case of public
communication with high cost and large minority. Communication nearly uniformly in-
creases the probabilities of upsets, with significant effects in half of the group communication
treatments.
Support. We report the corresponding results in Table 4.
Table 4: Effects of Communication on Electoral Characteristics
Group Communication minus No Communication
nA nB c ∆Tie ∆Pivot ∆Upset
6 4 0.1 −0.256∗∗∗ −0.312∗∗∗ −0.231∗∗∗
– – 0.3 −0.133 −0.214∗∗∗ −0.045
7 3 0.1 −0.082 −0.079 −0.064
– – 0.3 −0.139 −0.199∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗
Public Communication minus No Communication
nA nB c ∆Tie ∆Pivot ∆Upset
6 4 0.1 −0.072 0.022 −0.047
– – 0.3 −0.142 −0.235∗∗∗ 0.009
7 3 0.1 −0.004 −0.012 −0.033
– – 0.3 −0.077 −0.083 −0.094
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1
From Table 4, we find that communication nearly always decreases probabilities of ties,
pivotal events, and upsets. Out of 24 comparisons, 22 have a negative sign. The effect is
generally stronger for GC, and in all 12 GC vs. NC comparisons, the effect is negative.
However, these differences are significant in less than half the cases. The reason that these
differences are generally negative follows almost directly from the earlier observation that
communication (either GC or PC) always increases majority turnout by more than it in-
creases minority turnout, leading to wider margins of victory for the majority and fewer
close elections. 
17The expected margin of victory is defined in (1).
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3.2 Effects of changing the voting cost
Intuitively, increasing the voting cost should lead to a lower expected turnout. However,
the equilibrium effect is ambiguous for a few reasons. First, even without communication,
there are symmetric equilibria in which turnout is increasing in the cost; and communication
expands the set of equilibria relative to Nash, allowing for a wider range of expected turnout
relative to the no-communication equilibrium. Second, communication allows voters to co-
ordinate their actions, so it is possible that with communication, they might coordinate on
a higher turnout equilibrium with high voting costs than with low voting costs.
Result 4. (Cost Effect) Increasing the voting cost reduces the total turnout for each size
and communication treatment, except public. With public communication, increasing the cost
increases total turnout, and significantly so when the minority is large. In four out of six
treatments, these effects are driven by uniform changes in both parties’ turnout rates; in the
remaining two, they are driven by changes in one party’s turnout only. Increasing the voting
cost nearly uniformly increases the probability of pivotal events, with significant effects under
group communication and large minority, and under no communication and small minority.
Support. We first look at the effect of increasing the voting cost on turnout (Table 5), and
then report the effects on the electoral characteristics (Table 6).
Table 5: Effects of Cost on Turnout
High Cost minus Low Cost
nA nB Communication mode ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ
6 4 NC −0.196∗∗∗ −0.204∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗
– – GC −0.226∗∗∗ 0.028 −0.127∗∗∗
– – PC 0.115∗∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
7 3 NC −0.107∗∗∗ −0.027 −0.081∗∗
– – GC −0.165∗∗∗ −0.181∗∗∗ −0.165∗∗∗
– – PC −0.007 0.078∗∗ 0.019
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1
From Table 5, we see that reducing the voting cost increases total turnout for each size
and communication treatment, except for PC. Under PC, counterintuitively, reducing the
cost decreases total turnout, significantly so under PC and large minority. Breaking down
the total turnout by parties, we see that these changes usually produce similar effects on
party turnouts, except for GC with large minority, and NC with small minority, where the
majority is affected more, and PC with small minority, where the minority is affected more.
Table 6 presents the corresponding effects of the cost change on the electoral characteristics
considered earlier: the probability of ties, pivotal events, and upsets.
From Table 6, we see that reducing the voting cost does not significantly affect the probability
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Table 6: Effects of Cost on Electoral Characteristics
High Cost minus Low Cost
nA nB Comm. mode ∆Tie ∆Pivotal ∆Upset
6 4 NC −0.067 0.127 −0.055
– – GC 0.056 0.225∗∗∗ 0.132
– – PC −0.137∗ −0.130 0.001
7 3 NC 0.126 0.200∗∗ 0.108
– – GC 0.068 0.080 0.044
– – PC 0.053 0.129 0.047
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1
of ties. Reducing the cost decreases the probability of pivotal events under GC with large
minority and under NC with small minority. The probability of upsets is nearly uniformly
increasing in the cost (except for NC and large minority), but the changes are not significant.

3.3 Effects of changing the relative party sizes
We now turn to the effects of changing the party sizes while keeping the electorate size fixed.
Intuitively, when the minority party is closer to 50%, a competition effect should lead to
higher turnout in both parties. That is, the competition effect hypothesis is that turnout in
each party is decreasing in nA−nB. Thus, increasing the minority party size from 3 to 4 at the
expense of the majority party should increase turnout in each party. However, theoretically,
this is not always the case with the highest turnout equilibrium: a more competitive election,
ex ante, does not necessarily lead to higher equilibrium overall turnout. Furthermore, the
effect of election competitiveness can be different for the majority and minority parties. Table
1 shows that in the high turnout, quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium, the majority party
turnout is higher in more-competitive elections, but minority turnout is actually depressed,
and the theoretical effect of competitiveness on overall turnout can go either way; for our
experimental parameters, the effect of competitiveness on overall turnout is positive if cost
is low, but negative if cost is high. In both correlated and subcorrelated highest turnout
equilibria, the effect of competitiveness on overall turnout and on minority turnout is positive,
as intuitively expected. However, for the majority party, there is an interaction between cost
and competitiveness. With high cost, the effect of competitiveness on TA is positive, as
expected, but with low cost, it goes the other way.
In contrast to the rather ambiguous theoretical implications about the competition effect, the
data from the experiment speak quite clearly. In nearly all comparisons, there is a significant
competition effect.
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Result 5. (Competition Effect) Increasing competitiveness increases total turnout, ma-
jority party turnout, and minority party turnout.
Support. The effects on turnout are reported in Table 7. The competition effect on total
turnout is positive and significant in all cases but one in which it is not significant. The
competition effect on majority party turnout is positive and significant in all six cases. The
competition effect on minority party turnout is positive and significant in four out of six cases
and is insignificant in the remaining two. Overall, the effects are not particularly consistent
with the high-turnout equilibrium effects of competitiveness in Table 1, as the theoretical
sign of the competition effect depends on the cost of voting, and can go in different directions
for different parties. With a high voting cost, seven out of nine differences are significant
and have the same sign as the theoretical effect in Table 1. The remaining two differences
are not significant. However, with a low voting cost, half of the differences are significant
with the opposite sign.
Table 7: Effects of Changing the Relative Party Size on Turnout
Minority Size 4 minus Minority Size 3
c Comm. mode ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ
0.1 NC 0.156∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
– GC 0.222∗∗∗ −0.076 0.088∗∗
– PC 0.082∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗
0.3 NC 0.067∗ 0.021 0.049
– GC 0.161∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
– PC 0.204∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1
While we observe strong competition effects on turnout, there are no significant effects on
the probability of ties, pivotal events, and upsets.18 
3.4 Correlated equilibrium analysis and tests
In this section, we investigate whether adding communication results in a “higher” correla-
tion in voters’ choices, and whether the data are consistent with correlated and subcorrelated
equilibria. We start by making additional assumptions necessary for the tests and formulat-
ing the test hypotheses.
Assumptions and Hypotheses
For the analysis of correlation, we need frequency estimates of the joint turnout profiles from
the data. The number of such profiles in a 10-person electorate is 210, making it infeasible to
18See Table 21 in Appendix A.
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estimate frequencies with our data. To circumvent this problem, we reduce the number of
joint profiles to a manageable size by combining all the profiles that have the same number
of votes from each party and differ only by the identity of those voting and abstaining. This
reduction implicitly assumes that such profiles are equally likely. For example, we assume
that the following profiles have equal probability: a profile with all of the minority voting
and with voters 1, 2, and 3 of the majority voting; and a profile with all of the minority
voting and with voters 4, 5, and 6 of the majority voting. To state this assumption formally,
let µ(zi, a, b) denote the probability of any joint profile where player i plays strategy zi, and,
among the other n − 1 players, a players turn out in group NA and b players turn out in
group NB (where “groups” correspond to the majority and minority party, respectively, in
the context of our experiment).
Assumption 1. (Group-symmetric distributions). For all treatments, we consider only
distributions over joint voting profiles that satisfy the following restrictions:
∀i ∈ NA,∀a ∈ {1, . . . , nA − 1},∀b ∈ {0, . . . , nB} : µ(0i, a, b) = µ(1i, a− 1, b)
∀k ∈ NB,∀b ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1}, ∀a ∈ {0, . . . , nA} : µ(0k, a, b) = µ(1k, a, b− 1)
Applying Assumption 1, we now have a total of (nA + 1)(nB + 1) different profiles – i.e., 32
and 35 profiles in the small minority (7, 3) and large minority (6, 4) treatments, respectively,
for which frequencies can be estimated from the data. Furthermore, this assumption is also
plausible to hold in our data, since player IDs within each party are randomly reassigned
every round. We can now simply write µa,b for the probability of a joint profile with a votes
from party NA and b votes from party NB.
In addition, we assume that the joint probability distribution is fixed throughout the game
to ensure consistency of the frequency estimates.
Assumption 2. (Fixed distribution) The realized voting outcomes are drawn every round
from the same joint probability distribution (not necessarily an equilibrium one).
Next, we formalize and test the following three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. (Independent Voting Decisions) Each voter votes independently with the
same probability conditional on her party.
Hypothesis 2. (Quasi-symmetric Nash) With NC, individual voting probabilities of the
majority and minority party members, p∗A and p
∗
B, respectively, are determined by a quasi-
symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Hypothesis 3. (Correlated and Subcorrelated Equilibria) a) With PC, the vote distribution
is consistent with a correlated equilibrium; b) With GC, the distribution is consistent with a
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subcorrelated equilibrium.19
Hypotheses 1 – 3 inform us about important properties of voting behavior with and without
communication. If Hypothesis 1 holds, voting strategies can be described by two probabil-
ities, pA and pB, for voters in the majority and minority party, respectively. Notice that
Hypothesis 1 simultaneously requires independence and equal voting probabilities across
voters within the same party, so, in principle, it can be rejected due to a violation of either
property. But since Assumption 1 implies symmetry among all players in a party, we focus
on testing for independence only. Thus, if we find that Hypothesis 1 does not hold, we inter-
pret this as evidence for correlated voting. So, if Hypothesis 1 holds with no communication
but is rejected with communication, this implies that communication introduces correlation.
Moreover, this would immediately imply that the voting data with communication are not
consistent with Nash equilibrium play.
If Hypothesis 2 holds, the two voting probabilities under NC are pinned down by the equi-
librium conditions on p∗A and p
∗
B given in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, pp.27-28). If Hy-
pothesis 3 holds, then our simple communication protocols can effectively imitate a complex
correlating device required for correlated and subcorrelated equilibrium implementation (in
some correlated equilibria, private communication via some form of mediated communica-
tion would be required). If Hypothesis 3 is rejected, this could be due to voters not playing a
group-symmetric correlated/subcorrelated equilibrium (e.g., because of being boundedly ra-
tional or having social preferences) or, perhaps, because mediated communication protocols
are needed to implement the equilibrium correlating device.
3.4.1 Correlation in Voting Decisions
In this section, we investigate Hypotheses 1 and 2. The findings are summarized by
Result 6. (Independence and Correlation) Without communication, voters’ turnout
decisions are independent. Quasi-symmetric Nash is rejected under the high voting cost
but not under the low voting cost and large minority. Introducing communication results
in correlated turnout decisions in seven out of eight treatments, with no support for Nash
equilibrium play.
Support. First, we check Hypothesis 1. We employ two different tests to compare the
probability distribution of joint voting profiles estimated from the data with the induced
distribution under the null: Likelihood Ratio and Epps-Singleton, the latter being a more
powerful non-parametric alternative to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for comparing discrete
19Formal definitions of the correlated and subcorrelated equilibria are provided below.
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distributions (see Appendix A.1 for test details).
Table 8 shows that in all NC treatments, none of these tests rejects Hypothesis 1 (independent
voting) at the 0.05 level. Hypothesis 1 is rejected by the Likelihood Ratio test for all
communication treatments (except PC under low cost), as well as by the Epps-Singleton
test under high voting cost for both PC and GC, and under low cost for PC. Thus, both the
Likelihood Ratio and Epps-Singleton tests produce relatively consistent results. Since Epps-
Singleton does not take into account the variance in the estimation of pˆA and pˆB, we are more
confident in the Likelihood Ratio test when interpreting our results under communication.
Table 8: Test for Symmetric Independent Voting: Estimated vs. Induced Distributions
Communication nA nB c ES test LR test
W2 p-val LR χ
2
0.05
NC 6 4 0.1 1.173 .883 35.780 46.194 (32)
– – – 0.3 0.962 .916 35.631 –
GC – – 0.1 5.381 .250 215.444∗∗∗ –
– – – 0.3 19.339∗∗∗ .001 170.422∗∗∗ –
PC – – 0.1 12.715∗∗ .013 66.0291∗∗∗ –
– – – 0.3 15.968∗∗∗ .003 157.383∗∗∗ –
NC 7 3 0.1 4.636 .327 16.694 42.557 (29)
– – – 0.3 3.979 .409 30.330 –
GC – – 0.1 3.981 .409 168.517∗∗∗ –
– – – 0.3 12.202∗∗ .016 95.288∗∗∗ –
PC – – 0.1 0.815 .936 22.522 –
– – – 0.3 11.037∗∗ .026 73.897∗∗∗ –
Notes: W2 is the two-sample Epps-Singleton test statistic for discrete data, com-
puted using a modified version of the external Stata routine escftest. LR is the
likelihood ratio, corresponding χ20.05 critical value with (nA + 1)(nB + 1)−3 degrees
of freedom (either 32 or 29). Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1
In the NC treatments, we focus on testing Hypothesis 2 for the max turnout quasi-symmetric
Nash equilibrium because the summary data statistics indicate very high turnout rates that
are inconsistent with the low-turnout, quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium.20 The results of
the Epps-Singleton test are reported in Table 9. We reject Hypothesis 2 under high cost
(and, marginally, under low cost and small minority), but not under low cost and large
minority. Thus, in the low-cost NC treatments, the data are roughly consistent with a max-
turnout quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium. For communication treatments, we find that
voting decisions are correlated, so there is no consistency with Nash equilibrium.21 
20See Table 14 in Appendix A.
21As an extra check, we tested and rejected Nash under all communication treatments.
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Table 9: Test for Max-Turnout Quasi-Symmetric Nash under NC
nA nB c ES test
W2 p-val
6 4 0.1 2.752 .600
– – 0.3 48.595∗∗∗ .000
7 3 0.1 7.830∗ .098
– – 0.3 26.193∗∗∗ .000
Notes: W2 is the two-sample Epps-Singleton test statis-
tic for discrete data, computed using a modified version
of the external Stata routine escftest. The null hy-
pothesis is that the equilibrium distribution and the es-
timated distribution are the same. Significance codes:
∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1
3.4.2 Consistency with Correlated and Subcorrelated Equilibria
Having estimated the frequencies of all joint voting profiles, we can now test whether the
realized vote distribution forms a correlated or a subcorrelated equilibrium.
A correlated equilibrium (CE) is a probability distribution over joint voting profiles such
that at every profile, each player’s choice is a best response under the posterior distribution
conditional on that choice. Thus, in the turnout game, unlike Nash, there are two best
response conditions for each player: conditional on deciding to vote, and conditional on
deciding to abstain. Formally, CE is defined by the following 2n inequalities (in addition to
the standard probability constraints) for each i ∈ N :
2c ≥ Pr(i is pivotal | i abstains) (2)
2c ≤ Pr(i is pivotal | i votes) (3)
For a group-symmetric correlated equilibrium, Pogorelskiy (2014) shows that conditions (2)-
(3) can be simplified and written as system of four inequalities, two for players in NA, and two
for players in NB. Therefore, testing for consistency with a correlated equilibrium requires
checking that the four inequalities hold.
A Subcorrelated equilibrium(SCE) is a correlated equilibrium for which, in addition to con-
straints (2)-(3), the joint distribution over all-electorate voting profiles is decomposable as
a product of two independent distributions over party voting profiles. Thus, in a subcorre-
lated equilibrium, votes can be correlated within, but not across the two parties. This is a
relatively weak restriction. In contrast, Nash equilibrium restricts distributions over joint
profiles to be decomposable as a product of n independent voting probabilities.
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The technical details of the tests for Hypothesis 3 are in Appendix A.2. The main idea is
to compare the estimated probabilities of the joint profiles µˆa,b for each pair of vote counts
(a, b) with the induced probabilities µ˜a,b under the null of the respective Hypothesis. We
compare the two distributions by means of a two-sample Epps-Singleton test.
Result 7. (Correlated Equilibrium) Correlated and subcorrelated equilibria are both re-
jected for all public communication treatments and most group communication treatments.
We do not reject correlated equilibrium under group communication and low cost. We also
do not reject subcorrelated equilibrium under group communication, low cost, and small mi-
nority.
Support. Table 10 presents the results of our test for constraint violations for all of our
treatments. Inconsistency with equilibrium (indicated by a test rejection) is generally due
to the observation of too low a frequency of pivotal events, conditional on voting.22
Table 10: Test for Consistency with Correlated Equilibrium
Communication nA nB c IU stat
GC 6 4 0.1 5.435∗
– – – 0.3 68.689∗∗∗
PC – – 0.1 12.845∗∗∗
– – – 0.3 70.704∗∗∗
GC 7 3 0.1 1.412
– – – 0.3 92.843∗∗∗
PC – – 0.1 16.096∗∗∗
– – – 0.3 44.222∗∗∗
IU test statistic is defined in (11) in Appendix A.2.
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
We find, however, that under the low cost and GC, we cannot reject the the null of aggregate
voting behavior being consistent with a correlated equilibrium (and marginally reject it for
the large minority case). By contrast, we soundly reject the correlated equilibrium hypothesis
in the remaining treatments.23
Table 11 presents the results of our test for a subcorrelated equilibrium in the communication
treatments.24 The estimated group frequencies and equilibrium constraints are in Tables 24
– 25 in Appendix A.2.
We see from Table 11 that the test results for subcorrelated equilibrium are broadly in
line with the results for correlated equilibrium, and that GC, low cost, and small minority
22See Tables 22 – 25 in Appendix A. The results from Table 10 should be interpreted with caution, because
they are based on a relatively small number of observations, and because there are many possible profiles,
so the data are rather sparse.
23Strictly speaking, this is a joint hypothesis of a correlated equilibrium and Assumptions 1–2.
24Because the set of subcorrelated equilibria is contained in the set of correlated equilibria, rejection of
correlated equilibrium implies rejection of subcorrelated equilibrium (and Nash equilibrium).
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Table 11: Test for Consistency with Subcorrelated Equilibrium
Communication nA nB c IU stat
GC 6 4 0.1 14.895∗∗∗
– – – 0.3 214.053∗∗∗
PC – – 0.1 17.474∗∗∗
– – – 0.3 132.117∗∗∗
GC 7 3 0.1 4.766
– – – 0.3 125.806∗∗∗
PC – – 0.1 30.057∗∗∗
– – – 0.3 65.243∗∗∗
IU test statistic is defined in (11) in Appendix A.2.
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
remains the only consistent treatment. 
3.5 Analysis of Chat Data in Communication Treatments
In this section, we take a deeper look at the actual communication between subjects. Our
main goals here are to try to understand how PC differs from GC and how the number of
messages in different categories is related to turnout.
We recorded the messages that subjects exchanged during each pre-play communication
stage and employed an independent research assistant to classify and code the messages
according to ten general categories, listed in Table 12.
Table 12: Message categories and observed aggregate frequencies
Code Description Examples GC, % PC, %
0 Irrelevant “hello” 31.30 31.53
1 Disagreement “no!” 1.13 1.54
2 Agreement to a proposed joint strategy “alright” 7.43 3.74
3 General discussion about rules “you can only get 135 in type A” 23.67 18.79
4 Informative statement about history “one A chose Y last time” 7.23 5.06
5 Question to others: what are we going to do? “so X or Y?” 2.22 1.76
6 Strategy suggestion about others’/own/group
decision
“if you’re 1-4 pick x” 20.90 34.78
7 Own plan: will choose X “I’ll do X” 3.82 1.37
8 Own plan: will choose Y “I’ll do Y” 2.03 1.20
9 Ambiguous “not sure” 0.28 0.25
Total number of messages 12,134 12,967
We begin our analysis by looking at the message frequency distributions pooled across cost
and group size treatments.
Result 8. (Message Types) Public and group communication induce similar message
frequencies overall, but public communication treatments have more strategy suggestions and
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fewer agreement and own plan messages than group communication treatments. About 31%
of all messages are irrelevant in both communication treatments.
Support. We compute message frequencies for each category listed in Table 12 and report
them in the last two columns of that table. We observe a large fraction of irrelevant messages
(code 0: about 31% of the total of about 3,800 (about 4,100) messages under GC (PC).)
Other high-frequency categories of messages include strategy suggestions (code 6: about 21%
of the total under GC and about 35% under PC); and discussion about the rules of the game
(code 3: about 24% under GC and about 19% under PC.) The next two largest categories
are messages expressing agreement (code 2: about 7% under GC and about 4% under PC)
and messages informative about the history of play (code 4: about 7% under GC and about
5% under PC). A smaller fraction of messages relate to questions to others and own plans
(codes 5, 7, and 8, respectively.) The remaining categories – disagreement and ambiguous
messages – comprise, on average, less than 1.6% of the total messages.25 
To assess how the number of messages in different categories affects turnout rates, we estimate
a simple linear relationship, regressing for each communication treatment the normalized
total turnout26 on the total number of messages in each code category.
Result 9. (Message Effects) Irrelevant messages have no effect on the normalized turnout
rate, despite their large share. Agreement messages increase normalized turnout (significantly
with group communication); and disagreement messages decrease normalized turnout (sig-
nificantly with public communication). Total turnout increases in the number of messages
stating intent to vote and decreases in the number of messages stating intent to abstain.
Since intent messages are mostly truthful, this effect is driven largely by voters’ own turnout
rather than their influence on others.
Support. Table 13 reports estimates from an ordered probit model regressing the normalized
total turnout on the number of messages in each of the categories (with standard errors and
p-values reported in Table 28 in Appendix A.) We also estimate the ordinary least squares
model and find very similar results.
While the intent messages (the last two columns of Table 13) show significant effects, it could
25See Tables 26 – 27 in Appendix A for a breakdown of message frequencies by treatment and round.
Those tables suggest that the patterns are not a by-product of pooling across rounds or treatments. One
minor exception is that we observe a somewhat increasing proportion of irrelevant messages over rounds,
especially under PC.
26Normalized total turnout makes data from cost and size treatments suitable for pooling together by
taking into account deviations of individual observations from the treatment-specific averages. It is defined
for each group-round election i in treatment j ∈ {High cost, Low cost}×{Large minority, Small minority}×
{Public, Group} as tij = Tij−T¯jNj , where Tij is the total number of votes; T¯j is the average number of votes
(mean turnout rate); and Nj is the number of group-round observations.
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Table 13: Effects of the number of messages on normalized total turnout in communication
treatments
Communication Message Category
(Irrelev.) (Disagr.) (Agr.) (Hist.) (Q&S) (Vote) (Abst.)
Group −0.002 −0.010 0.054∗∗ 0.010 −0.005 0.148∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗
Public −0.002 −0.040∗∗ 0.016 −0.007 −0.001 0.282∗∗∗ −0.237∗∗∗
Notes. Table cells contain for each message code ordered probit estimates of the effects of the
total number of messages per electorate in that category on the normalized total turnout.
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1. For clarity of presentation we combined
messages with codes 0, 3, and 9 into the “Irrelevant” category. We also combined messages
with codes 5 and 6 into the “Q&S” category. The remaining message categories are as
described in Table 12.
well be the case that an increase (decrease) in total turnout is simply due to voters being
truthful about their plans. To see whether voters expressing the intent to vote or abstain
actually carry out their promises, we compute a “truth” rate, defined for each election
(group-round observation) as the ratio of truthful messages (i.e., a voter says that she’ll
vote and does vote, or she says that she’ll abstain and does abstain) to the total number
of intent messages in that election (i.e., messages with “vote” and “abstain” codes). The
average truth rate (pooled across majority and cost treatments) for GC is 0.841 (se = 0.015,
p = 0.000), and for PC, it is 0.792 (se = 0.025, p = 0.000). Thus, voters stating their intent
are mostly truthful.
Estimating the effect of intent messages on others’ turnout is far from straightforward: in the
same chat, there could be several voters expressing the intent to turn out, or some expressing
the intent to turn out and others the intent to abstain, and excluding all those who state
any intent would conflate the effects. Our crude estimates (available upon request) show
some effect of the intent messages on turnout through influencing the turnout of others,
but the bulk of the change is driven by voters’ own turnout (or non-turnout in the case of
abstention). 
4 Concluding remarks
This is the first laboratory study to examine how unrestricted and party-restricted pre-
election communication among voters affects turnout. The experiment investigated how
changes in communication structure, voting cost, and ex ante election competitiveness affect
turnout and electoral characteristics.
There are a number of central findings of the experiment. First, the main finding is that
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communication unambiguously benefits the majority party by increasing its expected turnout
margin. This finding is robust to all the different treatment variations in the experiment.
This result is surprising in the sense that we are not aware of any existing theoretical model
that would predict this systematic finding, including the Nash equilibrium model and our
related analysis of correlated equilibrium of the turnout game.
Second, we develop and apply a test for the effect of communication on correlation. With no
communication, we find strong evidence independence, but only limited support for symmet-
ric mixed Nash equilibrium. With communication, individual voting decisions are correlated,
but again find only limited support for correlated equilibrium, and no support for Nash equi-
librium. Overall, the effects of communication on correlation, and hence on outcomes, are
significant and comparable in magnitude to the effects of changing the main exogenous pa-
rameters of the model, which have traditionally been viewed as key driving variables that
influence turnout – i.e., voting cost and the competitiveness of the election.
Third, we observe an interaction effect between the form of communication and the voting
cost in terms of how these two factors influence overall turnout in elections. In particular,
party-restricted communication increases turnout for both cost levels. Unrestricted public
communication increases turnout with a high voting cost and large minority, but decreases
turnout with a low voting cost. This has potentially relevant policy implications, especially
since get-out-the-vote campaigns are shifting towards social media – reaching new levels of
political communication – and since changes in voting technology and election laws affect
the cost of voting.
Fourth, we find evidence for both a cost effect (turnout decreases in the voting cost) and a
competition effect (turnout increases in the relative size of the minority).
We wish to underscore the importance of developing rigorous theoretical models to explicitly
take communication possibilities into account. Correlated and Subcorrelated equilibria pro-
vide a useful framework for this. Testing for these equilibria in our data is the first attempt
to identify the general principles behind communication-based coordination in competing
groups using the correlated equilibrium approach.
Finally, it should be kept in mind that the structure of communication in our experiment was
very limited compared to what is possible in a typical mass election, in which communication
to and between voters is, to a large extent, coordinated and mediated by party leaders and
activists. To the extent that mediated communication may be necessary to implement some
correlated equilibrium turnout strategy profiles, one might expect even stronger effects of
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communication in the field than we observed in our laboratory experiment.27 The partial
success of this framework, especially the surprising and robust finding about the differential
effect of communication on majority and minority parties, invites further study, perhaps
with larger groups and other forms of communication.
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Appendix A Additional Details (for online publication)
The figures and tables in this appendix present additional estimation details for results in
Section 3.
Figure 2: User Interface (NC Treatment)
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Table 14: Mean Turnout and Group Welfare Rates By Treatment
NC
N nA nB c TˆA TˆB Tˆ Wˆ
40 6 4 .1 .600 (.030) .574 (.040) .587 (.032) .489 (.009)
– – – .3 .403 (.020) .371 (.018) .390 (.014) .442 (.010)
– 7 3 .1 .443 (.021) .377 (.044) .423 (.015) .614 (.026)
– – – .3 .336 (.033) .349 (.059) .341 (.029) .509 (.015)
GC
N nA nB c TˆA TˆB Tˆ Wˆ
80 6 4 .1 .873 (.018) .361 (.062) .670 (.027) .526 (.007)
– – – .3 .647 (.026) .389 (.052) .544 (.025) .408 (.013)
– 7 3 .1 .651 (.023) .436 (.053) .582 (.022) .620 (.013)
– – – .3 .486 (.016) .255 (.022) .417 (.012) .536 (.012)
PC
N nA nB c TˆA TˆB Tˆ Wˆ
80 6 4 .1 .491 (.033) .346 (.030) .432 (.013) .514 (.006)
– – – .3 .606 (.045) .460 (.043) .549 (.034) .395 (.011)
– 7 3 .1 .409 (.033) .180 (.022) .340 (.020) .633 (.018)
– – – .3 .402 (.019) .259 (.025) .359 (.012) .539 (.014)
Notes: N is the number of group decision observations. Panel-corrected
AR(1)-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 15: Mean Frequencies By Treatment
NC
N nA nB c Tie Pivotal Upset
40 6 4 0.1 0.272 (.044) 0.477 (.086) 0.259 (.049)
– – – 0.3 0.205 (.068) 0.603 (.052) 0.204 (.058)
– 7 3 0.1 0.111 (.182) 0.300 (.085) 0.116 (.084)
– – – 0.3 0.237 (.086) 0.500 (.035) 0.223 (.046)
GC
N nA nB c Tie Pivotal Upset
80 6 4 0.1 0.016 (.067) 0.165 (.053) 0.027 (.062)
– – – 0.3 0.072 (.059) 0.390 (.046) 0.159 (.064)
– 7 3 0.1 0.029 (.046) 0.221 (.038) 0.052 (.042)
– – – 0.3 0.097 (.031) 0.301 (.038) 0.096 (.034)
PC
N nA nB c Tie Pivotal Upset
80 6 4 0.1 0.200 (.051) 0.499 (.092) 0.212 (.031)
– – – 0.3 0.063 (.057) 0.369 (.045) 0.213 (.057)
– 7 3 0.1 0.107 (.089) 0.288 (.065) 0.083 (.056)
– – – 0.3 0.160 (.042) 0.417 (.049) 0.130 (.035)
Notes: N is the number of group decision observations. Panel-
corrected AR(1)-corrected standard errors are in parentheses
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Table 16: Effects of Communication on Turnout
GC v. NC
N nA nB c ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ ∆TˆA −∆TˆB ∆Margin
80 v. 40 6 4 0.1 0.274∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.214∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.083∗∗ (0.049) 0.490∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.447∗∗∗ (0.000)
– – – 0.3 0.244∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.018 (0.743) 0.154∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.227∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.264∗∗∗ (0.001)
– 7 3 0.1 0.208∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.060 (0.390) 0.160∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.150∗∗ (0.043) 0.118 (0.105)
– – – 0.3 0.150∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.094 (0.142) 0.076∗∗ (0.020) 0.244∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.331∗∗∗ (0.001)
PC v. NC
N nA nB c ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ ∆TˆA −∆TˆB ∆Margin
80 v. 40 6 4 0.1 −0.108∗∗ (0.016) −0.229∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.155∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.121∗ (0.078) 0.124∗ (0.086)
– – – 0.3 0.203∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.089∗ (0.058) 0.159∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.114∗∗ (0.027) 0.191∗∗∗ (0.003)
– 7 3 0.1 −0.034 (0.391) −0.196∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.082∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.162∗∗ (0.022) 0.143 (0.114)
– – – 0.3 0.066∗ (0.083) −0.091 (0.165) 0.018 (0.573) 0.153∗∗ (0.021) 0.257∗∗ (0.011)
Notes: Two-sided p-values in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1
Table 17: Effects of Communication on Electoral Characteristics
GC v. NC
N nA nB c ∆Tie ∆Pivotal ∆Upset
80 v. 40 6 4 0.1 −0.256∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.312∗∗∗ (0.003) −0.231∗∗∗ (0.004)
– – – 0.3 −0.133 (0.142) −0.214∗∗∗ (0.003) −0.045 (0.602)
– 7 3 0.1 −0.082 (0.665) −0.079 (0.401) −0.064 (0.498)
– – – 0.3 −0.139 (0.134) −0.199∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.127∗∗ (0.028)
PC v. NC
N nA nB c ∆Tie ∆Pivotal ∆Upset
80 v. 40 6 4 0.1 −0.072 (0.289) 0.022 (0.861) −0.047 (0.423)
– – – 0.3 −0.142 (0.112) −0.235∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.009 (0.913)
– 7 3 0.1 −0.004 (0.984) −0.012 (0.910) −0.033 (0.742)
– – – 0.3 −0.077 (0.427) −0.083 (0.170) −0.094 (0.107)
Notes: Two-sided p-values in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1
Table 18: Effects of Cost on Turnout
High Cost v. Low Cost
N nA nB Comm. mode ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ
40 6 4 NC −0.196∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.204∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.197∗∗∗ (0.000)
80 – – GC −0.226∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.028 (0.730) −0.127∗∗∗ (0.001)
– – – PC 0.115∗∗ (0.041) 0.114∗∗ (0.032) 0.117∗∗∗ (0.002)
40 7 3 NC −0.107∗∗∗ (0.008) −0.027 (0.712) −0.081∗∗ (0.017)
80 – – GC −0.165∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.181∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.165∗∗∗ (0.000)
– – – PC −0.007 (0.855) 0.078∗∗ (0.021) 0.019 (0.415)
Notes: Two-sided p-values in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
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Table 19: Effects of Cost on Electoral Characteristics
High Cost v. Low Cost
N nA nB Comm. mode ∆Tie ∆Pivotal ∆Upset
40 6 4 NC −0.067 (0.411) 0.127 (0.211) −0.055 (0.469)
80 – – GC 0.056 (0.533) 0.225∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.132 (0.141)
– – – PC −0.137∗ (0.076) −0.130 (0.207) 0.001 (0.994)
40 7 3 NC 0.126 (0.535) 0.200∗∗ (0.034) 0.108 (0.266)
80 – – GC 0.068 (0.217) 0.080 (0.142) 0.044 (0.416)
– – – PC 0.053 (0.590) 0.129 (0.116) 0.047 (0.478)
Notes: Two-sided p-values in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
Table 20: Effects of Changing the Relative Party Size on Turnout
Minority Size 4 v. Minority Size 3
N c Comm. mode ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ
40 0.1 NC 0.156∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.198∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.165∗∗∗ (0.000)
80 – GC 0.222∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.076 (0.355) 0.088∗∗ (0.011)
– – PC 0.082∗ (0.079) 0.165∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.092∗∗∗ (0.000)
40 0.3 NC 0.067∗ (0.084) 0.021 (0.732) 0.049 (0.139)
80 – GC 0.161∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.134∗∗ (0.019) 0.126∗∗∗ (0.000)
– – PC 0.204∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.201∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.190∗∗∗ (0.000)
Notes: Two-sided p-values in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
Table 21: Effects of Changing the Relative Party Size on Electoral Characteristics
Minority Size 4 v. Minority Size 3
N c Comm. mode ∆Tie ∆Pivotal ∆Upset
40 0.1 NC 0.161 (0.396) 0.177 (0.147) 0.143 (0.147)
80 – GC −0.013 (0.874) −0.056 (0.389) −0.024 (0.748)
– – PC 0.093 (0.369) 0.211∗ (0.064) 0.130∗∗ (0.044)
40 0.3 NC −0.032 (0.773) 0.104 (0.104) −0.020 (0.791)
80 – GC −0.026 (0.703) 0.089 (0.139) 0.063 (0.384)
– – PC −0.097 (0.171) −0.048 (0.471) 0.083 (0.219)
Notes: Two-sided p-values in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
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Figure 3: Voting patterns for Majority party.
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Figure 4: Voting patterns for Minority party.
35
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
(V
ote
)
0 10 20 30 40
Subject#
Pr(Vote|A) Pr(Vote|B)
(a) NC, partition (6, 4), c = 0.1
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
(V
ote
)
0 20 40 60 80
Subject#
Pr(Vote|A) Pr(Vote|B)
(b) GC, partition (6, 4), c = 0.1
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
(V
ote
)
0 20 40 60 80
Subject#
Pr(Vote|A) Pr(Vote|B)
(c) PC, partition (6, 4), c = 0.1
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
(V
ote
)
0 10 20 30 40
Subject#
Pr(Vote|A) Pr(Vote|B)
(d) NC, partition (6, 4), c = 0.3
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
(V
ote
)
0 20 40 60 80
Subject#
Pr(Vote|A) Pr(Vote|B)
(e) GC, partition (6, 4), c = 0.3
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
(V
ote
)
0 20 40 60 80
Subject#
Pr(Vote|A) Pr(Vote|B)
(f) PC, partition (6, 4), c = 0.3
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
(V
ote
)
0 10 20 30 40
Subject#
Pr(Vote|A) Pr(Vote|B)
(g) NC, partition (7, 3), c = 0.1
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
(V
ote
)
0 20 40 60 80
Subject#
Pr(Vote|A) Pr(Vote|B)
(h) GC, partition (7, 3), c = 0.1
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
(V
ote
)
0 20 40 60 80
Subject#
Pr(Vote|A) Pr(Vote|B)
(i) PC, partition (7, 3), c = 0.1
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
(V
ote
)
0 10 20 30 40
Subject#
Pr(Vote|A) Pr(Vote|B)
(j) NC, partition (7, 3), c = 0.3
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
(V
ote
)
0 20 40 60 80
Subject#
Pr(Vote|A) Pr(Vote|B)
(k) GC, partition (7, 3), c = 0.3
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
(V
ote
)
0 20 40 60 80
Subject#
Pr(Vote|A) Pr(Vote|B)
(l) PC, partition (7, 3), c = 0.3
Figure 5: Individual turnout frequencies.
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Appendix A.1 Tests for the presence of correlation
We test Hypothesis 1 as follows. First, estimate the probabilities of the joint profiles µa,b
from the data for each pair of vote counts (a, b), obtaining the estimated distribution µˆ.
Next, estimate independent and group-symmetric probability of a voter turning out in each
party, pA and pB, from the data as averages over individual subjects’ voting probabilities
in each group (depicted in Figure 5 for all subjects in all treatments), obtaining pˆA and
pˆB. Given these estimates, we compute the induced group voting probabilities γ˜ and δ˜ by
plugging in pˆA and pˆB into the formulas for the probability of a majority group profile with
a votes:
γ(a) =
(
nA
a
)
paA(1− pA)nA−a, (4)
and probability of a minority group profile with b votes
δ(b) =
(
nB
b
)
pbB(1− pB)nB−b, (5)
and compute the induced joint distribution under the null as µ˜a,b = γ˜(a)δ˜(b). Finally, we
compare the resulting distribution with the actual distribution (i.e., µ˜ with µˆ) by means
of a two-sample Epps-Singleton test, obtaining the W2 test statistic. Epps-Singleton is a
powerful non-parametric alternative to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann-Whitney tests
suited for comparing discrete distributions. The caveat of this approach is that one needs to
account for variance in the estimates pˆA and pˆB when generating the induced distribution.
Therefore we supplement the results of Epps-Singleton test with a maximum likelihood ratio
test (cf. Moreno and Wooders (1998, pp.57-58)). Let na,b be the number of times vote count
(a, b) was observed, and N =
∑nA
a=0
∑nB
b=0 na,b be the total number of observations in a given
treatment. The loglikelihood that a sample was generated by a multinomial distribution µ
can be written as
`(µ) = C +
nA∑
a=0
nB∑
b=0
na,b lnµa,b (6)
where C is a normalization constant. Under the null of Hypothesis 1, the loglikelihood is
maximized at
µˆ0a,b =
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(∑
a,b
a
nA
na,b
N
)a(
1−
∑
a,b
a
nA
na,b
N
)nA−a(∑
a,b
b
nB
na,b
N
)b(
1−
∑
a,b
b
nB
na,b
N
)nB−b
Under the alternative hypothesis of µ being an arbitrary multinomial distribution, the loglike-
lihood is maximized at µˆ1a,b =
na,b
N
. The null and the alternative have 2 and (nA+1)(nB+1)−1
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degrees of freedom, respectively. The likelihood ratio, −2 (`(µˆ0)− `(µˆ1)), is then asymptot-
ically distributed as χ2 with (nA + 1)(nB + 1)− 1− 2 degrees of freedom, so we can compare
the LR statistic with the χ2 critical value at 0.05 level.
To test Hypothesis 2, we plug in the Nash equilibrium probabilities in (4) and (5) (e.g.,
we set pA and pB equal to TA and TB from Table 1, respectively) and again compare the
predicted distribution with the actual one using Epps-Singleton test.
Appendix A.2 Tests for consistency with correlated and subcor-
related equilibrium
Correlated Equilibrium Under the group-symmetric distributions, defined in Assumption
1, we can rewrite conditions (2)-(3) as the following system of four inequalities, two for players
in NA, and two for players in NB, with respect to (nA + 1)(nB + 1) variables of the form(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b:
φ0A ≡
1
2
− c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA−1
a
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA−1
a
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1
)
−nA−1∑
a=1
min{a−1,nB}∑
b=0
(
nA−1
a
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA−1
a
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
 ≤ 0 (7)
φ1A ≡
nA∑
a=2
min{a−2,nB}∑
b=0
(
nA−1
a−1
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−1∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+1
(
nA−1
a−1
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b −
1
2
− c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA−1
a
)(
nA
a+1
) ( nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA−1
a−1
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
)
≤ 0 (8)
and
φ0B ≡
1
2
− c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nB−1
a
)(
nB
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nB−1
a
)(
nB
a
) ( nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
)
− nA∑
a=2
min{a−2,nB−1}∑
b=0
(
nB−1
b
)(
nB
b
) (nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
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a=0
nB−1∑
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(
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b
)(
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b
) (nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
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 ≤ 0 (9)
φ1B ≡
nA∑
a=2
min{a−1,nB}∑
b=1
(
nB−1
b−1
)(
nB
b
) (nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
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(
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)(
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b
) (nA
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)
≤ 0 (10)
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Let φ = [φ0A, φ
1
A, φ
0
B, φ
1
B] be a 4×1 vector of the left hand sides of the incentive compatibility
constraints (7)-(10). Notice that we can write φ = Jµ, where J ∈ R4×(nA+1)(nB+1) is a
constant Jacobian matrix, and µ ∈ ∆({0, . . . , nA+1}×{0, . . . , nB+1}) is a group-symmetric
probability distribution over joint voting profiles. Then µ is a group-symmetric CE if and
only if φ ≤ 0.
We now apply the inequality-based testing procedure described in Wolak (1989). Define
ν ≡ −φ = −Jµ, and let νˆ be its estimate from the experimental data, obtained from K
independent trials. Given µ, interpreted as a multinomial distribution with K trials and
(nA + 1)(nB + 1) outcomes, and a (nA + 1)(nB + 1)× (nA + 1)(nB + 1) variance-covariance
matrix Σ, we can derive by the Delta method that νˆ
a∼ N(ν0,Ω) and Ω = JΣJ ′.
We want to test H0 : ν0 ≥ 0 vs .ν0 6≥ 0. Following Wolak (1989), we define the test statistic
as
IU ≡ (νˆ − ν˜)′Ω−1(νˆ − ν˜), (11)
where
ν˜ ≡ arg min
ν≥0
(νˆ − ν)′Ω−1(νˆ − ν).
In our computations, we estimate νˆ = −Jµˆ, where µˆ is a vector of estimated joint fre-
quencies from K experimental trials, and replace Ω with its consistent estimate Ωˆ = JΣˆJ ′.
Suppose the IU test statistic computed from the data equals s, then Wolak (1989, Corollary
1) allows us to compute the p-value under the null hypothesis ν0 ≥ 0 as follows.
sup
ν0≥0
Prν,Ω[IU ≥ s] =
4∑
k=0
Pr(χ2k ≥ s)w(4, 4− k,Ω),
where Pr(χ2k ≥ s) denotes the probability that a χ2k random variable exceeds s, and w(4, 4−
k,Ω) is the probability that exactly 4− k out of 4 elements in ν˜ are strictly positive. These
weights can be computed by Monte Carlo simulations.28
Subcorrelated Equilibrium In order to test the subcorrelated equilibrium hypothesis, we
slightly modify the moment inequality procedure using the fact that now νˆ = −J [δˆ ⊗ γˆ],
where δˆ ∈ ∆({0, . . . , nB + 1}), γˆ ∈ ∆({0, . . . , nA + 1}) have sample covariance matrices Σˆ1
and Σˆ2, respectively (each estimated as a covariance matrix of a corresponding multinomial
distribution over group profiles), and ⊗ stands for Kronecker product. Using the Delta
28For the case with up to 4 restrictions analytical expressions for the weights are available in Kudo (1963)
and Shapiro (1985).
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method, we obtain that νˆ
a∼ N(ν0,Ω) and
Ω = H
[
Σˆ1 0
0 Σˆ2
]
H ′,
where
H4×(nB+1+nA+1) =
[
J [I[nB+1] ⊗ γˆ] J [δˆ ⊗ I[nA+1]]
]
,
and I[x] is an identity matrix of size x × x. The rest of the testing procedure is the same:
we compute the IU test statistic and test the null of H0 : ν0 ≥ 0 vs .ν0 6≥ 0.
40
Table 22: Joint Profile Frequencies and Test for Correlated Equilibrium, Partition (6, 4)
NC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a\b 0 1 2 3 4 a\b 0 1 2 3 4
0 0 0 0 0.025 0 0 0.025 0 0.050 0.025 0
1 0 0.025 0 0 0 1 0 0.050 0.025 0 0
2 0 0 0.075 0.050 0.025 2 0.025 0.225 0.125 0 0
3 0.025 0 0.050 0.175 0.025 3 0 0.100 0.150 0 0
4 0.050 0.050 0.100 0.050 0 4 0 0.075 0.075 0 0
5 0.025 0 0.025 0.125 0.025 5 0 0.025 0 0.025 0
6 0 0.025 0.025 0.025 0 6 0 0 0 0 0
φ0A 0.621 −0.311
φ1A −0.379 0.071
φ0B 0.263 −0.017
φ1B −0.613 0.223
IU stat 9.682∗∗, p = .014 24.747∗∗∗, p = .000
GC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a\b 0 1 2 3 4 a\b 0 1 2 3 4
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.025 0.037 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.025 0.013 0.013 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0.013 2 0.025 0.075 0 0.013 0.013
3 0 0 0 0 0.013 3 0.037 0.037 0.025 0 0.025
4 0.050 0.013 0.013 0 0.025 4 0.037 0.025 0.013 0.037 0.037
5 0.287 0.013 0.037 0.013 0.125 5 0.138 0.063 0.050 0.013 0.063
6 0.237 0 0.037 0.025 0.100 6 0.063 0.013 0 0.013 0.075
φ0A −0.054 −0.159
φ1A 0.260 0.406
φ0B −0.647 −0.387
φ1B 0.165 0.235
IU stat 5.435∗, p = .092 68.689∗∗∗, p = .000
PC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a\b 0 1 2 3 4 a\b 0 1 2 3 4
0 0.025 0.025 0.025 0 0 0 0 0.025 0 0 0.025
1 0.050 0.050 0.025 0 0 1 0.050 0 0 0 0
2 0.025 0.050 0.063 0.037 0 2 0 0.063 0.025 0.063 0.025
3 0.063 0.125 0.050 0.037 0 3 0.063 0.063 0.013 0.025 0.025
4 0.050 0.013 0.063 0.063 0.025 4 0.063 0.037 0.037 0.025 0.013
5 0.025 0.037 0.013 0 0 5 0.050 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037
6 0.037 0 0.050 0 0 6 0.050 0 0.013 0 0.100
φ0A 0.521 −0.207
φ1A −0.290 0.418
φ0B 0.504 −0.330
φ1B −0.369 0.252
IU stat 12.845∗∗∗, p = .003 70.704∗∗∗, p = 0.000
Notes: φij refers to incentive compatibility condition i for group Nj (see (7)-(10)). Corre-
lated equilibrium requires all IC constraints not to exceed zero. IU stat is defined in (11).
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
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Table 23: Joint Profile Frequencies and Test for Correlated Equilibrium, Partition (7, 3)
NC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a\b 0 1 2 3 a\b 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.050 0.075 0.025 0
1 0 0 0.025 0 1 0.050 0.075 0 0
2 0.125 0.100 0.075 0.025 2 0.100 0.075 0.125 0
3 0.075 0.150 0.050 0.025 3 0.025 0.125 0.025 0
4 0.025 0.125 0.075 0 4 0.050 0.025 0.075 0.025
5 0.025 0.050 0.050 0 5 0.025 0 0 0.025
6 0 0 0 0 6 0 0.025 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0
φ0A −0.021 −0.200
φ1A 0.032 0.169
φ0B −0.083 −0.233
φ1B −0.208 0.128
IU stat 0.065, p = .954 11.031∗∗∗, p = .008
GC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a\b 0 1 2 3 a\b 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.013 0.013 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0.087 0.075 0.013 0
2 0.013 0 0 0.037 2 0.025 0.050 0.025 0.013
3 0.050 0.013 0 0.037 3 0.150 0.025 0.013 0
4 0.175 0.037 0.037 0.150 4 0.113 0.013 0.050 0.013
5 0.138 0 0.025 0.050 5 0.125 0 0.013 0.050
6 0.138 0 0 0.050 6 0.063 0.013 0.013 0.025
7 0 0 0.013 0.037 7 0.013 0 0 0
φ0A −0.114 −0.323
φ1A 0.141 0.395
φ0B −0.572 −0.444
φ1B 0.058 0.145
IU stat 1.412, p = .512 92.843∗∗∗, p = .000
PC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a\b 0 1 2 3 a\b 0 1 2 3
0 0.025 0.013 0 0 0 0.063 0.013 0 0
1 0.050 0.087 0 0.013 1 0.087 0.037 0.013 0.013
2 0.138 0.075 0 0 2 0.163 0.087 0.050 0.013
3 0.150 0.125 0.037 0 3 0.087 0.025 0.013 0.013
4 0.075 0.050 0 0 4 0 0.075 0.037 0.025
5 0.075 0.037 0.013 0 5 0.025 0.037 0 0.013
6 0.025 0.013 0 0 6 0.075 0.025 0.013 0
7 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0
φ0A −0.029 −0.318
φ1A 0.125 0.262
φ0B 0.155 −0.319
φ1B 0.013 0.120
IU stat 16.096∗∗∗, p = .001 44.222∗∗∗, p = 0.000
Notes: φij refers to incentive compatibility condition i for group Nj (see
(7)-(10)). Correlated equilibrium requires all IC constraints not to exceed
zero. IU stat is defined in (11). Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05,
∗ < 0.1.
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Table 24: Group Profile Frequencies and Test for SubCorrelated Equilibrium, Partition (6, 4)
NC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a γ(a) b δ(b) a γ(a) b δ(b)
0 0.025 0 0.100 0 0.100 0 0.050
1 0.025 1 0.100 1 0.075 1 0.475
2 0.150 2 0.275 2 0.375 2 0.425
3 0.275 3 0.450 3 0.250 3 0.050
4 0.250 4 0.075 4 0.150 4 0
5 0.200 5 0.050
6 0.075 6 0
φ0A 0.419 −0.206
φ1A −0.496 0.098
φ0B 0.253 −0.120
φ1B −0.466 0.136
IU stat 11.656∗∗, p = .013 21.234∗∗∗, p = .000
GC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a γ(a) b δ(b) a γ(a) b δ(b)
0 0 0 0.575 0 0.063 0 0.350
1 0 1 0.025 1 0.050 1 0.263
2 0.013 2 0.087 2 0.125 2 0.100
3 0.013 3 0.037 3 0.125 3 0.075
4 0.100 4 0.275 4 0.150 4 0.212
5 0.475 5 0.325
6 0.400 6 0.163
φ0A −0.060 −0.193
φ1A 0.174 0.451
φ0B −0.585 −0.464
φ1B 0.191 0.237
IU stat 14.895∗∗∗, p = .001 214.053∗∗∗, p = 0.000
PC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a γ(a) b δ(b) a γ(a) b δ(b)
0 0.075 0 0.250 0 0.050 0 0.275
1 0.125 1 0.300 1 0.050 1 0.225
2 0.175 2 0.287 2 0.175 2 0.125
3 0.275 3 0.138 3 0.188 3 0.150
4 0.188 4 0.025 4 0.175 4 0.225
5 0.075 5 0.200
6 0.087 6 0.163
φ0A 0.371 −0.194
φ1A −0.139 0.388
φ0B 0.337 −0.375
φ1B −0.234 0.220
IU stat 17.474∗∗∗, p = .000 132.117∗∗∗, p = 0.000
Notes: φij refers to incentive compatibility condition i
for group Nj (see (7)-(10)). Subcorrelated equilibrium
requires all IC constraints not to exceed zero and also
satisfy group independence. IU stat is defined in (11).
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
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Table 25: Group Profile Frequencies and Test for SubCorrelated Equilibrium, Partition (7, 3)
NC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a γ(a) b δ(b) a γ(a) b δ(b)
0 0 0 0.250 0 0.150 0 0.300
1 0.025 1 0.425 1 0.125 1 0.400
2 0.325 2 0.275 2 0.300 2 0.250
3 0.300 3 0.050 3 0.175 3 0.050
4 0.225 4 0.175
5 0.125 5 0.050
6 0 6 0.025
7 0 7 0
φ0A −0.062 −0.258
φ1A −0.135 0.176
φ0B 0.189 −0.258
φ1B −0.120 0.131
IU stat 1.268, p = .756 21.406∗∗∗, p = .000
GC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a γ(a) b δ(b) a γ(a) b δ(b)
0 0 0 0.512 0 0.025 0 0.575
1 0 1 0.050 1 0.175 1 0.188
2 0.050 2 0.075 2 0.113 2 0.138
3 0.100 3 0.362 3 0.188 3 0.100
4 0.400 4 0.188
5 0.212 5 0.188
6 0.188 6 0.113
7 0.050 7 0.013
φ0A −0.170 −0.351
φ1A 0.131 0.391
φ0B −0.543 −0.474
φ1B 0.145 0.140
IU stat 4.766, p = .109 125.806∗∗∗, p = 0.000
PC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a γ(a) b δ(b) a γ(a) b δ(b)
0 0.037 0 0.537 0 0.075 0 0.500
1 0.150 1 0.400 1 0.150 1 0.300
2 0.212 2 0.050 2 0.313 2 0.125
3 0.313 3 0.013 3 0.138 3 0.075
4 0.125 4 0.138
5 0.125 5 0.075
6 0.037 6 0.113
7 0 7 0
φ0A −0.068 −0.327
φ1A 0.125 0.278
φ0B 0.209 −0.370
φ1B −0.040 0.101
IU stat 30.057∗∗∗, p = .000 65.243∗∗∗, p = 0.000
Notes: φij refers to incentive compatibility condition i
for group Nj (see (7)-(10)). Subcorrelated equilibrium
requires all IC constraints not to exceed zero and also
satisfy group independence. IU stat is defined in (11).
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
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Appendix A.3 Analysis of chat data
Table 26: Message frequencies by round under GC
nA nB Cost Round N Message Code
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(Irr.) (Disagr.) (Agr.) (Rules) (Hist.) (Q?) (Strat.) (Vote) (Abst.) (Amb.)
6 4 0.1 1 269 20.45 2.23 15.99 24.16 0.00 3.35 26.77 5.20 1.49 0.37
– – – 2 262 19.47 1.15 14.50 24.05 5.73 4.58 26.72 2.67 1.15 0.00
– – – 3 343 23.32 2.04 10.20 25.66 6.12 2.33 25.36 2.92 2.04 0.00
– – – 4 268 21.64 0.37 8.96 36.19 4.85 2.99 21.27 1.87 1.49 0.37
– – – 5 293 20.82 0.68 8.87 27.65 10.58 2.05 17.75 9.56 2.05 0.00
– – – 6 293 31.74 1.02 7.85 18.77 5.46 2.73 23.21 8.19 0.34 0.68
– – – 7 322 27.02 2.17 8.39 26.71 1.24 2.80 20.81 6.52 4.35 0.00
– – – 8 283 34.28 0.00 9.19 25.09 5.65 2.12 15.90 5.65 2.12 0.00
– – – 9 328 27.44 0.61 3.96 32.01 7.93 1.52 20.12 5.49 0.61 0.30
– – – 10 312 31.09 0.32 7.37 28.53 7.05 1.28 17.95 5.45 0.64 0.32
– – 0.3 1 276 25.72 2.17 17.03 22.10 2.17 4.71 20.29 4.71 0.72 0.36
– – – 2 281 17.79 1.42 11.39 24.91 6.41 5.69 24.20 3.20 4.63 0.36
– – – 3 296 27.70 1.35 11.49 22.97 4.05 4.39 21.62 2.03 4.39 0.00
– – – 4 287 31.01 2.09 11.15 23.00 6.27 2.09 19.16 1.74 3.14 0.35
– – – 5 253 20.95 4.35 7.11 28.85 5.14 1.58 23.32 3.16 5.14 0.40
– – – 6 289 22.15 1.73 10.03 27.34 9.69 1.04 22.49 3.46 1.73 0.35
– – – 7 303 32.67 1.65 3.63 24.42 7.26 1.32 24.09 3.63 1.32 0.00
– – – 8 269 36.06 1.49 6.69 13.75 9.67 1.12 24.91 3.72 2.60 0.00
– – – 9 305 36.72 1.64 6.56 21.97 5.25 1.97 20.33 2.30 3.28 0.00
– – – 10 288 44.44 0.69 7.64 14.24 10.76 2.08 17.71 1.39 1.04 0.00
7 3 0.1 1 328 34.15 0.61 10.67 25.30 1.83 1.83 18.29 4.27 3.05 0.00
– – – 2 410 23.66 0.98 4.39 19.27 3.41 1.46 39.76 3.17 2.68 1.22
– – – 3 270 32.96 0.37 12.22 21.11 8.52 2.22 17.78 1.85 2.59 0.37
– – – 4 267 44.19 0.37 7.87 22.10 7.49 0.37 14.61 1.87 1.12 0.00
– – – 5 300 42.00 0.33 6.00 24.67 5.67 0.33 17.00 3.33 0.67 0.00
– – – 6 302 39.40 0.66 3.97 30.46 7.95 0.66 12.25 3.31 1.32 0.00
– – – 7 306 37.91 0.33 4.58 23.86 14.05 0.33 15.36 3.59 0.00 0.00
– – – 8 309 33.98 0.65 4.85 25.57 9.71 2.27 16.18 3.88 1.62 1.29
– – – 9 299 47.16 1.00 4.68 14.38 10.70 0.67 17.73 3.01 0.67 0.00
– – – 10 365 36.71 1.10 2.74 22.19 8.77 3.01 21.64 3.29 0.00 0.55
– – 0.3 1 345 28.99 2.03 8.99 29.86 2.32 4.35 18.55 2.03 1.74 1.16
– – – 2 310 26.77 0.65 6.77 21.94 7.42 3.23 26.45 1.94 4.52 0.32
– – – 3 289 30.80 0.69 4.50 25.26 4.50 2.08 25.26 6.57 0.35 0.00
– – – 4 296 28.38 1.01 5.07 25.00 7.43 3.38 20.95 6.08 2.70 0.00
– – – 5 354 31.07 3.11 5.37 20.06 7.91 1.13 23.45 5.08 2.82 0.00
– – – 6 284 28.52 0.35 5.63 20.77 17.25 3.87 19.01 1.06 1.76 1.76
– – – 7 296 39.86 0.00 6.42 17.57 10.14 1.01 18.24 3.72 3.04 0.00
– – – 8 319 34.17 0.63 4.39 22.88 8.15 1.88 24.14 2.19 1.57 0.0
– – – 9 303 37.29 0.33 2.97 15.18 17.16 1.65 18.15 4.29 2.97 0.00
– – – 10 362 38.67 0.83 3.59 26.80 8.56 1.93 12.43 4.97 1.93 0.28
Notes. Table cells contain for each message code percentages of the total number of messages in a given round. For
code category description see Table 12.
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Table 27: Message frequencies by round under PC
nA nB Cost Round N Message Code
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(Irr.) (Disagr.) (Agr.) (Rules) (Hist.) (Q?) (Strat.) (Vote) (Abst.) (Amb.)
6 4 0.1 1 265 24.91 0.75 3.40 20.00 1.51 4.15 39.25 3.02 2.26 0.75
– – – 2 229 21.83 1.75 6.11 23.58 5.24 1.75 36.24 0.87 2.62 0.00
– – – 3 567 14.81 0.18 4.06 9.88 2.65 1.23 65.08 0.71 1.23 0.00
– – – 4 389 16.71 0.26 1.54 16.71 3.86 1.03 58.10 0.77 1.03 0.00
– – – 5 407 26.04 1.47 2.21 14.25 2.95 0.25 51.60 0.49 0.74 0.00
– – – 6 357 33.33 0.28 2.80 10.64 6.16 2.52 43.42 0.28 0.28 0.28
– – – 7 303 30.69 0.33 1.32 19.47 3.96 0.66 40.26 0.99 2.31 0.00
– – – 8 279 52.33 1.08 2.87 19.00 2.51 2.15 18.28 0.00 1.08 0.72
– – – 9 290 40.69 0.00 2.41 17.59 3.10 3.79 27.59 1.72 3.10 0.00
– – – 10 326 61.66 0.31 1.53 9.51 3.37 1.23 21.78 0.00 0.61 0.00
– – 0.3 1 218 25.23 1.83 6.88 30.28 1.38 2.75 30.28 0.92 0.46 0.00
– – – 2 239 22.59 0.84 7.53 22.59 9.62 1.26 32.22 2.93 0.42 0.00
– – – 3 253 20.55 1.19 5.93 35.57 5.14 2.37 25.69 3.16 0.40 0.00
– – – 4 252 27.38 0.40 4.37 32.94 6.75 0.79 24.21 1.59 1.59 0.00
– – – 5 707 10.33 1.27 0.85 12.87 2.12 0.71 70.30 1.27 0.28 0.00
– – – 6 377 15.92 1.33 3.71 30.24 6.10 1.06 38.73 2.39 0.27 0.27
– – – 7 314 27.07 3.50 3.50 22.61 6.69 1.27 31.53 1.59 1.91 0.32
– – – 8 493 30.63 1.01 3.45 8.92 4.87 1.42 47.87 0.81 1.01 0.00
– – – 9 278 43.17 2.16 3.24 15.11 8.63 0.72 23.74 2.16 1.08 0.00
– – – 10 293 42.66 1.02 3.07 19.45 6.14 1.71 20.14 4.10 1.71 0.00
7 3 0.1 1 245 27.76 1.22 13.06 20.00 0.82 3.27 29.80 1.22 2.04 0.82
– – – 2 230 22.17 2.61 10.00 13.48 6.52 3.91 38.70 1.30 1.30 0.00
– – – 3 295 20.34 0.34 8.81 24.07 3.39 3.05 37.97 0.00 2.03 0.00
– – – 4 305 36.72 2.95 3.93 19.67 3.93 1.64 30.49 0.66 0.00 0.00
– – – 5 311 36.66 0.32 5.47 16.72 2.89 1.29 36.33 0.00 0.00 0.32
– – – 6 389 34.45 1.03 2.31 18.77 2.31 2.31 36.76 0.00 1.54 0.51
– – – 7 321 34.89 0.62 5.61 16.20 6.54 0.93 32.40 0.62 1.56 0.62
– – – 8 333 43.84 0.60 2.10 13.21 6.61 1.50 30.03 1.80 0.30 0.00
– – – 9 365 39.45 0.00 3.56 15.34 1.37 1.92 38.36 0.00 0.00 0.00
– – – 10 431 40.37 0.70 1.39 10.67 3.25 1.16 41.53 0.46 0.46 0.00
– – 0.3 1 285 30.88 1.05 9.12 24.56 2.46 4.56 22.46 2.81 1.05 1.05
– – – 2 270 34.81 1.85 6.30 26.67 4.07 1.11 21.85 1.85 0.37 1.11
– – – 3 277 37.18 4.69 2.89 23.83 7.94 1.08 19.13 1.08 1.81 0.36
– – – 4 279 31.90 3.23 3.94 27.24 8.60 1.79 22.58 0.36 0.00 0.36
– – – 5 346 27.75 12.72 2.02 20.52 13.29 0.87 18.79 1.73 2.31 0.00
– – – 6 278 39.93 3.24 3.24 23.02 7.55 1.08 18.35 0.36 2.52 0.72
– – – 7 270 30.00 1.85 4.81 25.93 11.85 2.96 13.70 5.19 2.96 0.74
– – – 8 316 37.03 0.95 1.58 21.52 13.61 2.85 13.61 6.01 1.27 1.58
– – – 9 307 43.00 2.28 1.30 22.48 7.49 3.26 14.01 2.61 3.26 0.33
– – – 10 278 61.15 0.72 0.72 16.55 2.88 1.44 15.11 0.00 1.44 0.00
Notes. Table cells contain for each message code percentages of the total number of messages in a given round. For
code category description see Table 12.
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Table 28: Effects of the number of messages on normalized total turnout in communication
treatments
Communication N Message Code
0+3+9 1 2 4 5+6 7 8
(Irr) (Disagr.) (Agr.) (Hist.) (Q&S) (Vote) (Abst.)
Group 320 −0.002 −0.010 0.054∗∗ 0.010 −0.005 0.148∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗
(.005) (.057) (.024) (.018) (.011) (.035) (.037)
[.616] [.860] [.022] [.569] [.696] [.000] [.008]
Public – −0.002 −0.040∗∗ 0.016 −0.007 −0.001 0.282∗∗∗ −0.237∗∗∗
(.004) (.016) (.026) (.024) (.001) (.061) (.061)
[.698] [.012] [.554] [.762] [.387] [.000] [.000]
Notes. Table cells contain for each message code ordinary probit estimates of the effects of
the total number of messages per electorate in that category on the normalized total turnout
in a given treatment. For detailed message code description see Table 12. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are computed using N electorate-round level observations. Corresponding
p-values are in brackets. Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
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Appendix B Sample Instructions (for online publica-
tion)
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research experiment on group decision making.
During the experiment we require your complete, undistracted attention. So we ask that
you follow instructions carefully. Please do not open other applications on your computer,
chat with other students, read books, or do homework. Also make sure to turn off your cell
phone.
For your participation, you will be paid in cash, at the end of the experiment. Different
participants may earn different amounts. What you earn depends partly on your decisions,
partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance. So it is important that you listen
carefully and fully understand the instructions before we begin. There will be a short com-
prehension quiz after the upcoming practice session, which you all need to pass before we
can begin the paid matches.
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and all interaction among
you will take place through the computers. It is important that you not talk or in any way
try to communicate with other participants during the experiments, except according to the
rules described in these instructions. We will start with a brief instruction period. During
the instruction period, you will be given a complete description of the experiment and will
be shown how to use the computers. If you have any questions during the instruction period,
raise your hand and your question will be answered out loud so everyone can hear. If any
difficulties arise after the experiment has begun, raise your hand, and an experimenter will
come and assist you privately.
This experiment consists of two different parts. The instructions for part 2 will be delivered
after part 1 is completed. At the end of the experiment you will be paid the sum of what
you have earned in both parts, plus the show-up fee of $7. Everyone will be paid in private,
and you are under no obligation to tell others how much you earned.
[Turn on the projector and start the multistage server]
Here are the instructions for part 1. Part 1 consists of several matches. Your earnings in part
1 will be determined as follows: the computer will randomly select two matches from part 1,
and you will be paid what you earned in those two matches. All matches are equally likely
to be chosen as the paid matches. Your earnings during the experiment are denominated
in points. Your US dollar earnings are determined by multiplying your earnings from the
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paid matches in points by a conversion rate. In this experiment, the conversion rate is 0.07,
meaning that 100 points is worth $7.
Please click on the Client Multistage icon. This window will appear (SHOW SCREEN 2
[client information].) Enter your computer name (e.g., SSEL01) in the box that appears and
then click Submit. You will then see this screen. (SHOW SCREEN 3 [initializing].)
Please turn your attention to the screen at the front of the room. We will demonstrate how
the matches are played. Please do not begin unless we tell you to do so. Please have your
attention focused on the stage during this demonstration period.
Once everyone has logged in, you will be randomly assigned to one of two types: type A or
type B. You will see this screen (SHOW SCREEN 4 [user interface, either with or without
chat, depending on treatment].)
At the top of the screen is your player id number. This is your id within your type. Once
the first practice match starts, you will be randomly assigned a type label (A or B) and
an id within this type. You will have the same type label, but your player id may change
from match to match. Below the screen informs you which type you are in and how many
members there are of each type. As you can see, type A has 6 (reverseSequence: 7) members
and type B has 4 (reverseSequence: 3) members.
[start here for COMMUNICATION treatments]
Next on the screen is a time counter showing how many seconds you are allowed to chat with
the other [(GC): players of your type /(PC): players] before making your choice. All matches
will have two stages. At the first stage you can use the chat feature to communicate with
other [(GC): players of your type /(PC): players] about the decision making problem. Each
message you send or receive in this chat stage is visible to all players of [(GC): your type, but
not to players of the other type. /(PC): both types]. At the second stage, everyone will be
asked to independently choose between two options, as will be described shortly. Messages
sent by you are displayed in red and have ‘[you]’ at the identifying string. Messages sent by
other players are displayed in black. All messages include the sender’s player id and type
label. During the communication stage we require you to be courteous and polite to other
participants, and also preserve the anonymity of interaction. That is, you are not allowed to
communicate any personal information that might identify you to other participants. Once
the time counter reaches zero, the communication stage is over, and you will see this screen
(SHOW SCREEN 5 [user interface when chat is over, GC or PC].)
[start here for CONTROL CASE (NC); continue here for other treatments]
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Next on the screen is a table, describing how your earnings depend on your choice of either
X or Y and on which type has the most members choosing X. The display in front of the
room shows you what the screen looks like for a player of type A. You will choose either
X or Y by highlighting the corresponding row label and clicking with your mouse. (SHOW
SCREEN 5x and 5y and 6 [showing highlighting], use screens with chat for communication
treatments.) After you and the other participants have all made your choices of X or Y
in a match the screen will change to highlight the row corresponding to your own choice,
and the column of the type which had the greatest number of players choosing X (SHOW
screen for completed match). Your earnings from each match are computed in the following
way. It is very important that you understand this, so please listen carefully. Suppose you
choose X. If your type has more players choosing X than the other type, then you will earn
105 points, if both types have the same number of players choosing X, then you will earn
55 points, and if the other type has more players choosing X than your type, then you will
earn 5 points. Alternatively, suppose you choose Y. If your type has more players choosing
X than the other type, then you will earn 115 (high-cost: 135) points, if both types have the
same number of players choosing X, then you will earn 65 (high-cost: 85) points, and if the
other type has more players choosing X than your type, then you will earn 15 (high-cost:
35) points Here is an example: suppose that one player of type A chose X and two players
of type B chose X. Then the B type has more players choosing X than the A type. Each
player of type A who chose X earns 5 points; each player of type A who chose Y earns ten
(high-cost: thirty) additional points making it 15 (high-cost: 35) points; the players of type
B who chose X earn 105 points, and each player of type B who chose Y earns ten (high-cost:
thirty) additional points making it 115 (high-cost: 135) points. The bottom of the screen
contains a history panel. During the experiment, this panel will be updated to reflect the
history of your past matches. For each match you can see the match number, your type in
that match, your choice, your earnings from that match if it is chosen to be a paid match
by the computer, and the number of each type choosing X. Your type will remain the same
for all matches. However, the actual membership in your type will be randomly reshuﬄed
after each match. Here is how the matching works (SHOW MATCHING SLIDE). There
are 20 people in this room. First, we randomly divide you into two types, A and B. Next,
we randomly pick 6 (reverseSequence: 7) people of type A, 4 (reverseSequence: 3) people of
type B, randomly assign ids within each type and put them together in one group. Then
we pick 6 (reverseSequence: 7) remaining people of type A, 4 (reverseSequence: 3) people
of type B, randomly assign ids and put them together in the second group. Next match, we
repeat the same process again. Thus, you will remain the same type, but your player id as
well as the other players of your type in your group will change from match to match. If
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you have any questions at this time, please raise your hand and ask your question so that
everyone in the room may hear it.
PRACTICE [BRING UP PAYMENT SCREEN FOR PRACTICE SESSION]
We will now give you a chance to get used to the computers with a short practice session.
Please take your time, and do not press any keys or use your mouse until instructed to do
so. You will NOT be paid for this session; it is just to allow you to get familiar with the
experiment and your computers. Please pull out your dividers. [start practice]
[NC] Everyone please choose X. Once everyone has made their selection, the results from
this first practice match are displayed on your screen. The outcome of the match is now
highlighted. The number of players who chose X is greater for type A, so the potential payoff
from this match (if it is selected by the computer) is 105 points for players of type A. For
players of type B, the potential payoff is 5 points, since for them it is the other type that
has more players choosing X. Remember, you are not paid for this practice match. We will
now proceed to the second practice match. Notice that you may have been assigned a new
player id. Now please everyone chose Y. Once everyone has made their selection, the results
from this second practice match are displayed on your screen. The number of players who
chose X is the same (zero) for both types, so the potential payoff from this match (if it is
selected by the computer) is 65 (high cost: 85) points for players of either type. We have
now completed the practice session, and the quiz popped up.
[COMMUNICATION] Notice that the 110-second communication stage has started. To send
a message [GC: to the other players of your type/ (PC): to other players], click on the text
field, type in your message and either press Enter or click ‘Send’. [(GC): Remember, each
message you send or receive in this chat is visible to all players of your type, but not to the
players of the other type. / (PC): Remember, each message you send or receive in this chat
is visible to all players of both types.] During the communication stage we require you to be
courteous and polite to other participants, and also preserve the anonymity of interaction.
That is, you are not allowed to communicate any personal information that might identify
you to other participants. After the communication stage is over, please wait for further
instructions, and don’t click anywhere.
[Wait for the subjects to chat]
Now that the communication stage is over, please everyone choose X. Once everyone has
made their selection, the outcome of the match is highlighted. The number of players who
chose X is greater for type A, so the potential payoff from this match (if selected by the
computer) is 105 points for players of type A. For players of type B, the potential payoff is
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5 points, since for them it is the other type that has more players choosing X. Remember,
you are not paid for this practice match. We will now proceed to the second practice
match. Notice that you may have been assigned a new player id. This time a 60-second
communication stage has started, so that we can move on to the paid matches quicker. After
the communication stage is over, please wait for further instructions.
[Wait for the subjects to chat]
Now please everyone chose Y. Once everyone has made their selection, the results from this
second practice match are displayed on your screen. The number of players who chose X is
the same (zero) for both types, so the potential payoff from this match (if it is selected by
the computer) is 65 (high cost: 85) points for players of either type. We have now completed
the practice session, and the quiz popped up.
[QUIZ] Please read each question carefully and check the correct answer. Once everyone has
answered the questions correctly, you may all go on to the second stage of the quiz. After
successfully completing the second round of questions, we will commence with the first paid
session. If you have questions during the quiz, please raise your hand. [END QUIZ]
The next remaining matches in Part 1 will follow the same rules as the practice session.
Let me summarize those rules before we start. Please listen carefully. In each match, 6
(reverseSequence: 7) players are assigned to type A, and 4 (reverseSequence: 3) players are
assigned to type B. You may choose X or Y. As you can see on the table of this screen, if
you choose X, your payoff will be 105 points if your type has more players choosing X than
the other type, 5 points if your type has fewer players choosing X, and 55 points if both
types have the same number of members choosing X. If you choose Y, your match payoff
will be 115 (high-cost: 135) points if your type has more players choosing X than the other
type, 15 (high-cost: 35) points if your type has fewer players choosing X than the other
type, and 65 (high-cost: 85) points, if both types have the same number of players choosing
X. Computer will randomly select two matches from part 1, and in part 1 you will be paid
what you earned in those two matches. All matches are equally likely to be chosen as paid
matches. Are there any questions before we begin the paid matches? [Answer questions.]
[BRING UP PAYMENT SCREEN FOR part 1]
Please begin. (Play matches 1–10.) Part 1 is now over.
[SESSION 2] Here are the instructions for part 2 of the experiment.
[BRING UP PAYMENT SCREEN FOR SESSION 2]
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The second part will be slightly different from the first part. Let me summarize those rules
before we start. Please listen carefully. There will be a series of matches in this part. In each
match, 7 (reverseSequence: 6) players will be assigned to type A, and 3 (reverseSequence:
4) players will be assigned to type B. In the first match your type label will be assigned as
follows. [SHOW MATCHING SCREEN] If you were of type B during part 1, you will now
be assigned to type A for all matches. If you were of type A during part 1, in each match
there is an equal chance that you either remain assigned to type A, or will be assigned to
type B. So if you were of type A during part 1, each match now you may have a different
type label and player id. If you were in type B during part 1, your type label will remain
the same for all matches in part 2. As before, the actual membership in your type will be
randomly reshuﬄed after each match, so the other members of your type will change from
match to match, as well as your player id even if your keep the same type. In any case,
there is always information at the top of the screen telling you your player id and which type
you are. Your earnings in part 2 will be determined similarly as before. The computer will
randomly select two matches from part 2, and you will be paid what you earned in those two
matches. All matches are equally likely to be chosen as paid matches. Your total earnings
from the experiment will be the sum of your earnings from both parts, plus the show-up
fee. Are there any questions before we begin the second paid session? Please begin. (Play
matches 1–10.) Part 2 is now over. The experiment is now completed. Thank you all very
much for participating in this experiment. Please record your total payoff in U. S. dollars at
the experiment record sheet. Please add your show-up fee of $7 and write down the total,
rounded up to the nearest dollar. After you are done with this, please remain seated. You
will be paid in the office at the back of the room one at a time. Please bring all your things
with you when you go to the back office. You can leave the experiment through the back
door of the office. Please refrain from discussing this experiment while you are waiting to
receive payment so that privacy regarding individual choices and payoffs may be maintained.
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